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This thesis consists of three self-contained articles. In the first article "The
Common Currency Channel of Risk Sharing", I propose a new channel of in-
ternational risk sharing: the common currency channel. I show theoretically
that the central bank of a currency union can use the common currency to
insure member countries against consumption risk from idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shocks. A trade-off between risk-sharing and moral hazard emerges: a
central bank which enables risk sharing induces countries to free ride on each
other’s production efforts. I study this trade-off and derive rules for a central
bank striking the optimal balance between insurance and incentives. Mone-
tary policy determines current account imbalances that are financed through
the central bank. Optimal policy is contingent on the realization of aggregate
production. The central bank should lower its policy rate in response to a
decrease in aggregate production to provide insurance through the common
currency. Revisiting European Central Bank policies during the Eurocrisis
between 2008 and 2014, I interpret the buildup of TARGET2 balances as risk
sharing through the common currency. I find that this channel accounts for
up to 60% of risk sharing among Eurozone countries in the early stages of the
Eurocrisis. I conclude that the common currency can be a substitute for risk
sharing through fiscal integration.
The second article "Riding the Cycle" (joint work with Christoph Wolf)
studies the interplay between the business cycle and financial contracting. If
the success probability of an investment project is increasing in both the busi-
ness cycle state and the borrower’s effort, then the borrower can free-ride on
the cycle. In a model of financial contracting with moral hazard, we show
that this free-riding generates procyclical agency costs. The overall effect of
viii
business cycle conditions on credit availability depends on how changes in
agency costs compare to cycle-induced changes in the net present value of
investment projects. In a dynamic extension, we endogenize the business cy-
cle as a function of the output realized through past credit contracts. The
dynamic economy has a unique stable steady state. If agency frictions in the
economy are sufficiently strong, a small shock to the business cycle can cause
the economy to fluctuate between business cycle ups and downs. The cycles
are induced by the interplay of the negative agency cost effects and the posi-
tive output effects of the business cycle. Our theory sheds new light upon the
observed patterns of secured and unsecured credit in U.S. data from 1981 to
2012.
The third article "Diversity Taxes" (joint work with Saumya Deojain) stud-
ies how social conflict generated through cultural diversity affects public pol-
icy. In our model, social conflict arises when diverse groups impose negative
consumption externalities on each other. These externalities can be miti-
gated by a government which transforms cultural consumption into public
good consumption. We show that in such a framework, ‘diversity taxes’ arise
as a policy tool to regulate the externalities from the cultural consumption
of diverse groups. We link the size of such taxes to characteristics of the un-
derlying distribution of cultural groups as well as to the type of government
(majority and minority). In contrast to much of the literature, our analy-
sis predicts that more diverse communities have a bigger government size as
measured by local taxes per capita. Using U.S. city and county data from
1990, we are able to verify this prediction. We find strong evidence for the
existence of sizeable ’diversity taxes’ in U.S. localities after controlling for a
variety of socioeconomic and demographic indicators. We further document
statistically significant relationships between characteristics of the group size
distribution and local taxes per capita which are in line with our hypothesized
link between cultural diversity, negative externalities, and taxation.
ix
1 THE COMMON CURRENCY CHANNEL OF RISK SHARING
1 The Common Currency Channel of Risk Sharing
1.1 Introduction
The classical doctrine of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) holds that a central bank
should lend to ’illiquid but solvent’ banks without limit, against good collateral and at
high rates.1 However, there is evidence that during crisis times, central banks are not
lending against good collateral, and not at high rates. During the Eurocrisis from 2008
to 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) consistently reduced its collateral require-
ments and lowered its refinancing conditions for commercial banks from countries hit by
crisis. In this paper, I show that a central bank may find it optimal to deviate from
the LOLR principles when union members are hit by asymmetric shocks. I argue that
the central bank can use the common currency to insure member countries against the
adverse impact of heterogeneous productivity shocks on consumption. The amount of
risk sharing depends on the real rate at which the central bank refinances net currency
flows between member countries. The central bank controls this rate through its choice
of collateral requirements in monetary operations. I empirically demonstrate that the
ECB was providing insurance through the common currency. Linking the buildup of
TARGET balances to the finance of current account deficits, I find that the common
currency channel provided up to 60% of total risk sharing among Eurozone countries at
the early stages of the Eurocrisis.
The informal description of risk sharing through a common currency goes back to
Mundell [1973]. My contribution is to provide a theoretical framework which allows me
to formally present the common currency channel of risk sharing. Within this framework,
I derive rules for a central bank operating this channel. Finally, I use the model to in-
terpret ECB policies during the Eurocrisis as risk sharing through the common currency.
In my model, a currency union consists of a finite number of regions or countries. Each
region has access to two production technologies. A safe asset delivers a fixed amount
of output while a risky production technology delivers stochastic output. Regional firms
operate the risky technology. Their output is determined by unobserved regional banker
effort and a regional productivity shock. The central bank issues the common currency
to regional banks against the safe asset before productivity shocks are realized. Currency
1See Bagehot [1873] and, more recently, Goodhart [1999].
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in the model is a non-contingent nominal deposit contract. The regional banker forwards
the currency to regional firms. Regional firms use the currency to hire labor which is
provided by regional consumers. Consumers use the currency to buy output from firms
in all regions of the currency union. This implies that the common currency insures re-
gional consumers against the consumption risk arising from regional productivity shocks.
The absence of exchange rates means that regional consumers hold claims on the output
of all firms in the currency union. This is the insurance value of the common currency.
The absence of flexible exchange rates between members of a currency union leads to
currency flows between member countries with different regional production levels. More
specifically, countries which produce less than the average country will suffer from net
money outflows. Countries which produce more than the average country will receive
net money inflows. The real value of these net money flows is given by the trade deficits
between the different member regions. Net money flows appear at the central bank which
operates the unified payment system of the currency union. The central bank’s policy
instrument is the real rate at which it refinances net money flows between regions. More
specifically, the central bank determines how many units of the safe asset it transfers
from a deficit region to a surplus region per unit of net money flow. That is, the central
bank decides the rate at which it monetizes the safe asset. If the central bank requires
a safe asset transfer whose value is equal to the real value of net money flows between
regions, then it refinances net money flows ’at market rate’. The resulting allocation is
equal to the allocation obtained if each region had issued its own currency. If, however,
the central bank requires a safe asset transfer whose value is less than the real value of
net money flows between regions, then it refinances net money flows ’below market rate’.
This is the channel through which the common currency provides risk sharing. In the
model, overdraft balances represent the fraction of current account imbalances which are
financed through the central bank’s provision of common currency below market rates.
Overdraft balances are a symptom of risk sharing through the common currency.
I show that the creation of overdraft balances is equivalent to a situation in which the
central bank redistributes seigniorage revenue to regions with production levels lower than
the union-wide average.2 The unequal distribution of seigniorage revenue is the channel
through which the central bank’s operations have real effects. I show that there is an
2Seigniorage revenue is the profit that occurs to the issuer of currency.
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equivalence between monetary policy and fiscal transfers in my model. Any risk-sharing
allocation that can be sustained through the common currency can also be sustained
through a fiscal authority that taxes overall production in the economy and transfers the
proceeds to regions with low production levels. However, I show that due to the moral
hazard problem from unobserved banker effort, Arrow security trades would not imple-
ment the efficient risk sharing allocation in this economy.
To study optimal monetary policy, I derive the second best risk sharing allocation of
the real economy. I show that the central bank which maximizes the expected utility of
member regions can implement this allocation through its choice of real refinance rates.
Optimal policy is driven by two considerations. First, moral hazard limits the amount of
insurance the central bank can optimally provide. If countries are fully insured against
the realization of their idiosyncratic production, then regional bankers will be tempted to
free-ride on banker efforts in other countries. As all countries try to do the same, overall
production in the currency union will be inefficiently low. The central bank prevents this
by setting a real refinance rate which implements an agency wedge such that individual
countries are partially exposed to the realization of their individual production. Second,
optimal monetary policy is determined by aggregate production in the currency union.
The central bank optimally announces a policy rate schedule which depends on aggregate
production. This schedule implies that in the event of a decrease in aggregate output,
the central bank should lower its real refinance rate to provide the optimal amount of
insurance through the common currency. This schedule incentivizes regional bankers to
exert effort and implements the second best risk sharing allocation. However, the optimal
refinance schedule is generally not time consistent. If the central bank lacks commitment,
then it is inclined to fully insure regions against negative production shocks ex post. In
an extension of the baseline model, I show that an appropriate design of the governing
council of the central bank can overcome this commitment problem. More specifically,
if any region can veto deviations from the announced policy schedule, then central bank
commitment can be restored.
In an empirical application, I revisit the policies taken by the European Central Bank
(ECB) during the Eurocrisis between 2008 and 2014. I document that the ECB adjusted
its refinancing policies (collateral requirements, maturity of refinance operations, and
interest rates) over the course of the Eurocrisis years such that, in absence of other effec-
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tive risk sharing channels, large TARGET2 balances arose. TARGET2 balances measure
claims and liabilities between national banks within the Eurosystem arising from net
cross-border payment flows. They are the real-world equivalent of the overdraft balances
arising in my model as a result of risk sharing through the common currency. I follow the
literature in analyzing the Eurocrisis as a balance-of-payment crisis within a currency
union and interpret TARGET2 balances as a mechanism through which the required
adjustments to current account deficits by Periphery countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, Spain) have been delayed. As a result, TARGET2 balances cushioned the oth-
erwise even more dramatic reduction in consumption per capita. Using the balance of
payment identity, I quantify TARGET transfers from current account and TARGET2
balance data. More specifically, I calculate adjusted current account balances for each
Euro country by considering a counterfactual in which countries with current account
deficits reduce these deficits by an amount equal to the increase in their TARGET2 bal-
ances. The so obtained TARGET transfers are of substantial size. They amount to 9%
of GDP in 2009 and 11% of GDP in 2010 for Greece, to 5.7% of GDP in 2008 and 4.2%
of GDP in 2009 for Ireland, and to 9.6% of GDP in 2010 and 5.4% of GDP in 2011 for
Portugal. In a next step, I estimate the contribution of these implicit TARGET transfers
to risk sharing during the Eurocrisis following the cross-sectional variance decomposition
methodology in Asdrubali et al. [1996]. This methodology allows to measure the frac-
tion of shocks to GDP which are smoothed through different channels of international
risk sharing. Traditional channels of international risk sharing are factor income flows,
savings, and international transfers. I find that none of these channels was particularly
effective during the Eurocrisis. Instead, I document that TARGET transfers contributed
substantially to risk sharing in the early stages of the Eurocrisis in 2008 and 2009. Dur-
ing those years, TARGET transfers explain 60% of risk sharing in the entire sample of
Eurozone countries and 80% for Periphery countries. Between 2010 and 2014, TARGET
transfers turn out to be dis-smoothing due to decreasing current account deficits, but still
imply substantial transfers from Core to Periphery countries.3
Risk sharing through the common currency is a possibility in any currency union. The
central bank decides at which rate to refinance net money flows between member regions
3Core countries are Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, and Finland.
Periphery countries are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (sometimes also referred to as GIIPS).
4
1 THE COMMON CURRENCY CHANNEL OF RISK SHARING
or countries. If it does so below market rates, then it allows for risk sharing through the
common currency. However, two conditions need to be fulfilled for the common currency
channel to be quantitatively relevant. First, member regions need to suffer from asym-
metric productivity shocks. Second, these shocks must not be smoothed through other
risk sharing channels. Both conditions were fulfilled during the Eurocrisis. The lack of
fiscal integration in the Euro area shifted the burden of risk sharing to the European
Central Bank. In the U.S., for example, productivity shocks are generally more symmet-
ric across states, and, most importantly, asymmetric shocks are smoothed through fiscal
transfers or other risk sharing channels. The unique constitution of the Eurozone as a
currency union without fiscal integration and asymmetric shocks to national income after
2008 provided the grounds for the empiricial relevance of the common currency channel
of risk sharing.
1.1.1 Related Literature
Risk sharing through a common currency was first informally discussed by Mundell [1973].
He argues that a common currency allows to mitigate shocks across countries as it repre-
sents a fixed claim against currency union-wide output. Flexible exchange rates inhibit
this risk sharing as an adverse shock to a country’s production leads to a devaluation of
its currency. This devaluation reduces the currency’s purchasing power and prevents the
country with an adverse shock from drawing on resources of other countries. A corollary
from this argument is that a common currency is particularly beneficial for countries with
asymmetric business cycle shocks. This is in contrast with the literature on optimum cur-
rency areas (OCA) which was pioneered by Mundell [1961] (see Alesina et al. [2002] for
an overview).4 This literature identifies synchronized business cycle movements to be one
of the prerequisites for an optimum currency area. The reason is that a common currency
implies the loss of independent monetary policy and, in the presence of nominal rigidities,
prevents nominal exchange rate adjustments to act as shock absorbers. In this paper, I
abstract from any nominal rigidities. Instead, I formalize the argument in Mundell [1973]
to study the common currency channel of risk sharing.
A few other papers have studied risk sharing through a common currency. Most related
4Mundell [1961] is sometimes referred to as ’Mundell I’ while Mundell [1973] is referred to as ’Mundell
II’ (see McKinnon [2004]).
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to my approach are Voss [1998], Ching and Devereux [2003], and Tornell [2018]. Voss
[1998] studies how the central bank of a currency union can reduce consumption volatil-
ity by allowing regional disparities in the growth of money supply. Similar to my work,
risk sharing is ultimately achieved through the state-dependent division of seigniorage
revenue. However, Voss [1998] abstracts from moral hazard arising from asymmetric in-
formation. As a result, he can only derive the risk sharing benefit under the assumption
of exogenously incomplete markets. In my model, however, the moral hazard problem
implies endogenous market incompleteness in the sense that Arrow security trades will
not implement the second best risk sharing allocation. Furthermore, my model has the
advantage that it links risk sharing through the common currency to current account
imbalances between countries. This allows a better map to the Eurocrisis than regional
disparities in the growth rate of money supply. Ching and Devereux [2003] present a
model of optimum currency areas which incorporates the costs from losing independent
monetary policy as well as the benefits from enhanced risk sharing. In my model, giving
up independent national monetary policies has no direct costs, but rather the insurance
through a common currency comes at the cost of moral hazard. The focus of my paper
is on the existence and optimal operation of the common currency channel of risk shar-
ing, not on the question of optimum currency areas. Tornell [2018] interprets TARGET2
balances as an automatic loan from the currency union via the central bank and studies
the TARGET2 system as a risk sharing mechanism that smooths the effects of negative
shocks.5 His main focus is on the effect of this implicit bailout guarantee on national
debt accumulation which he studies in a dynamic political-economy model. My focus, on
the other hand, is on formalizing the notion of risk sharing through a common currency.
From this I derive principles how the central bank of a currency union can actively man-
age the moral hazard arising from risk sharing through a common currency.
Most of the theoretical literature on banking assumes that contracts are written in real
terms.6 Notable exceptions from this are Skeie [2008] and Allen et al. [2014] who build
models of banking crises in which contracts are written in nominal terms. The fact that
contracts are written in nominal terms is key to my analysis since the central bank can
always reprint nominal claims at zero cost. This stands in stark contrast to ’real models’
5Schelkle [2017] informally develops a similar argument.
6See Freixas and Rochet [2008] and Gorton and Winton [2003] for an overview of the literature.
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with no explicit reference to the money creation process. In my model, the central bank
cannot directly produce output, but redistributes parts of aggregate production through
seigniorage. The monetary environment in my model is similar to the one in Allen et al.
[2014]. In fact, I regard the findings in my paper as complimentary to their finding that
a central bank which accommodates the demands of the private sector for fiat money
allows full sharing of liquidity risk. The risk to be shared in Allen et al. [2014] is the
liquidity risk introduced by Diamond and Dybvig [1983] as a preference shock for early
consumption. In contrast, my paper deals with productivity risks and shows that a com-
mon currency actively managed by a central bank can achieve the constrained efficient
allocation.
The rules derived for optimal monetary policy in my model bear similarity with the
literature on deposit insurance, bank risk taking and state-dependent penalties (see Mar-
shall and Prescott [2006], Boyd et al. [2002], Allen et al. [2018], and Allen et al. [2015] for
an overview). In my model, the central bank implicitly insures all regional deposits as it
stands ready to refinance regional net currency outflows. However, to mitigate the moral
hazard problem arising from insurance through the common currency, the central bank
announces refinancing rates which act as state-dependent penalties. Optimal monetary
policy in my model comprises central bank refinancing rates which resemble collateral
requirements. This underlines the importance of collateral frameworks in the conduct of
monetary policy as discussed in the emerging literature on central bank collateral frame-
works (see Nyborg [2017], Koulischer et al. [2015], Choi et al. [2019], Bindseil and Jablecki
[2013]). In explicitly modeling the modern two-layered payment system comprising in-
terbank payments through a central bank, I follow the distinction of inside and outside
money going back to Gurley and Shaw [1960] which was recently embedded in modern
macro models by Piazzesi and Schneider [2018] and Bianchi and Bigio [2014].
Similar to my paper, Chari and Kehoe [2008] study moral hazard within monetary
unions. In their model, national governments in a monetary union are tempted to not
properly regulate their domestic banks in an attempt to free-ride on other government’s
regulation efforts. I study how a similar free-riding problem can be addressed through
policy decisions by the central bank to implement the second best allocation of risk shar-
ing. Persson and Tabellini [1996] study the trade-off between incentives and insurance
in a federal fiscal union. In their model, through insuring regions against idiosyncratic
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risks, the federal government induces regions to take less effort in ensuring these negative
risks do not materialize. In my model, the central bank faces the same trade-off. In fact,
money and monetary policy have real effects without reference to sticky prices or wages.
The real effects come from the fact that the refinancing operations of the central bank
imply real resource transfers through an uneven distribution of (implicit) seigniorage rev-
enues. This renders monetary policy quasi-fiscal in my model. The broader point here is
that in the absence of risk sharing through a fiscal union, a currency union can play a
similar role in implementing risk sharing between union members.
There is a vivid debate about TARGET2 balances and their role during the European
balance-of-payment crisis. See Sinn [2014] for a comprehensive narrative of the Eurocrisis.
Merler and Pisani-Ferry [2012] and Higgins and Klitgaard [2014] summarize the evidence
for a ’sudden stop’ crisis in the Eurozone and discuss the balance of payment within
a monetary union. Sinn and Wollmershäuser [2012] outline the implicit fiscal transfers
through TARGET2 balances. I add to this literature by conceptualizing TARGET2 bal-
ances as a symptom of risk sharing through a common currency and by studying the
trade-offs arising for a central bank operating this channel of international risk sharing.
Asdrubali et al. [1996] proposed a methodology to quantify the contribution of different
risk sharing channels to overall consumption smoothing. They distinguish between the
capital market channel, the credit market channel, and the fiscal channel. While they
initially studied the United States, many authors have conducted similar analyses for
Europe, both before the introduction of the Euro (Sørensen and Yosha [1998]) as well as
after its introduction (Kalemli-Ozcan et al. [2014], Milano et al. [2017], Cimadomo et al.
[2018]). My contribution to this strand of literature is to include the common currency
channel as a fourth channel into the empirical analysis. Similar to the authors mentioned
above, I find that the traditional risk sharing channels have not been particularly effec-
tive during the Eurocrisis. However, I find that the common currency channel has been
effective during the early stages of the crisis, accounting for up to 60% of risk sharing in
the years of 2008 and 2009.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the model setup.
In section 1.3, I derive the constrained efficient risk sharing allocation (second best).
Section 1.4 shows how a common currency allows for risk sharing, and studies how the
central bank can achieve the second best allocation through monetary policy. Section 1.5
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establishes the quantitative importance of the common currency channel of risk sharing
during the Eurocrisis. Section 1.6 discusses several extensions to the baseline model.
Section 2.5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
1.2 The Real Economy
Agents and preferences. Consider an economy which consists of N ⊂ N symmetric
regions. There are two dates: t = 0, 1. Each region i ∈ N = {1, 2, ..., n} is inhabited by
one representative household and a continuum of firms. Similar to Gertler and Kiyotaki
[2010] and Gertler and Karadi [2011], the household entails a risk-averse consumer and
a risk-neutral banker. At t = 0, the consumer is endowed with one unit of labor which
he inelastically supplies to firms within the same region. Consumers in region i cannot
supply labor to firms in region j 6= i. Firms use consumer labor as the sole input factor.
At t = 0, the banker is endowed with one unit of the consumption good (’safe asset’).
He can exert costly effort to enhance the productivity of firms within his region (through
monitoring, for example). A banker in region i cannot enhance productivity of firms in
region j 6= i. The effort level is binary, ei ∈ {0, 1} and freely observed by the consumer
within the same household, but not by consumers in households from different regions.




1− η − k · ei (1.1)
where ci denotes the consumer’s consumption which consists of the banker’s endowment
and the goods produced by firms. k > 0 is an effort cost parameter, and η > 0 measures
the risk aversion of the consumer.
Production technology. Regional firms operate a production technology which re-
quires one unit of labor input at t = 0 and produces a stochastic return at t = 1. More
specifically, each region is subject to a regional productivity shock which can be either
high or low: zi ∈ {H,L}. The probability of a high shock is given by q ∈ (0, 1). It is i.i.d.
across regions.7 The regional shock impacts the production of all firms within a region
7All results go through if regional shocks are allowed to be correlated across regions. As correlated
shocks reduce the tractability of the model, I focus on the benchmark case of i.i.d. shocks.
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equally. Regional production is given by
yi =

AH if zi = H and ei = 1
AL otherwise
(1.2)
where AH > AL > 0. If the region is hit by a low shock or if the banker does not
exert effort, then regional production is given by AL. If the region is hit by a high shock
and the banker exerts effort, then regional production is given by AH . Importantly, the
incidence of low output might be due to bad luck (low shock) or lacking banker effort.
Other regions cannot infer which of the two caused the low output. I assume that if a
region is in isolation, the regional banker exerts effort:
q
(1 + AH)1−η
1− η + (1− q)
(1 + AL)1−η
1− η − k >
(1 + AL)1−η
1− η (1.3)
The consumption good can be traded between regions at zero cost.8 As regional shocks
are i.i.d. across regions, regional risk sharing is possible. In fact, as consumers are risk-
averse, an insurance scheme between regions is welfare improving.
Aggregate production risk. As the number of regions, N , is finite, aggregate pro-
duction in this economy is uncertain. More specifically, there is uncertainty about the
number of regions m ∈ {0, 1, ..., N} with high shocks. The random variable mN follows
a binomial distribution with parameters N and q:





Xi where X1, ..., Xn i.i.d.∼ Bernoulli(q) (1.5)
If regional bankers exert effort, aggregate production is given by YN = mNAH + (N −
mN)AL. I refer to the uncertainty over the realization of mN as aggregate production risk.
Timeline and Information. Figure 1.1 summarizes the timing of the real economy.
At t = 0, regional bankers are endowed with one unit of the consumption good and
choose their effort level ei. This effort level is unobserved by other regions. Regional
shocks are not directly observed by anybody. At t = 1, regional firms produce output
according to the realized regional productivity shock as well as banker effort exerted at
8Introducing trading frictions between regions does not change results qualitatively.
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t = 0. Regional output is freely observed by everybody. At t = 1, the amount of goods
available in region i is equal to 1 + yi where yi ∈ {AH , AL}.





Figure 1.1: Timeline (real economy)
1.3 Constrained Efficient Allocation
In this section, I will present the second best risk sharing allocation as the solution to
an information-constrained central planning problem. In section 1.4, I will show how the
second best allocation can be implemented in a monetary environment through a central
bank.
A risk sharing allocation in the real economy described above is defined as follows.
Definition 1.1 (Risk Sharing Allocation).
Let aggregate production be given by m ∈ {0, 1, ..., N}. A risk sharing allocation is given




L , ..., c
(N−1)
L }, consumption




H , ..., c
(N)







H , ..., t
(N)






L , ..., t
(N)
L }, and
total transfers between regions T (m) = {T (0), ..., T (1), ..., T (N)}.
In this definition, the element c(m)H of the vector c
(m)
H denotes consumption of a region
with high output when a total of m regions produce high output, while c(m)L denotes
consumption of a region with low output. t(m)H denotes the transfer to a region with high
output if m regions have high output levels. This transfer can be positive or negative.
Similarly, t(m)L is the transfer to a region with low output when a total of m regions have
high output levels. Note that without the unobservability of regional banker effort, the
central planning problem is trivial: The central planner would require all regional bankers
to exert effort, and then divide aggregate production equally amongst regions.
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Lemma 1.1 (First Best Allocation).
The first-best allocation is such that each region’s consumption is a state-invariant func-






N +mAH + (N −m)AL
N





H − (1 + AH) =











T (m) = (N −m)t(m)L = −mt
(m)
H =
m(N −m)(AH − AL)
N
(1.9)
The first best allocation implies that regions perfectly share the consumption risk arising
from idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Risk sharing is achieved through real resource
transfers from regions with high output to regions with low output.
With unobservable banker effort, however, any insurance scheme that fully insures a
region against consumption risk reduces the regional banker’s incentive to exert effort. If
no banker exerts effort, any insurance scheme will suffer from an underprovision of effort
leading to low output and consumption levels. Thus, the central planner needs to strike
the optimal balance between insuring regions against idiosyncratic production risks and






































H + (N −m)c
(m)



































1− η ≥ q
A1−ηH







L ≥ 0 (NNC)
(1.10)
The planner’s objective function is the expected utility of a (representative) region which
12
1 THE COMMON CURRENCY CHANNEL OF RISK SHARING
is exerting effort. As there are N regions each of which is subject to a Bernoulli pro-
ductivity shock, there are 2N states of the world at the end of the period. Aggregate
production risk arises from the fact that there are N + 1 distinct aggregate produc-























. With probability q, a region
which exerts effort ends up with high output, and with probability 1− q it ends up with
low output. Hence, the first term in the expression for the planner’s objective function
sums over the different consumption levels allocated to a region with high output for all
potential realizations of aggregate production. Similarly, the second term sums over the
consumption levels allocated to a region with low output for all potential realizations
of aggregate production. When maximizing the objective function, the central planner
needs to obey four constraints. First, the aggregate resource constraint (RC) restricts
the central planner to ex post budget balance. That is, for any aggregate production
realization m, the planner cannot allocate more goods than there are goods produced.
Effectively, this implies that the central planner cannot produce any goods himself, i.e.
he cannot transfer goods between different states of the world. Second, the incentive con-
straint (IC) ensures that the allocation is such that for every region, the expected utility
of exerting effort is higher than the expected utility of not exerting effort. Third, the ex
ante regional participation constraint (PC) requires that, in expectation, the insurance
scheme is (weakly) welfare impoving for each region. That is, it cannot leave regions
worse off than if there was no insurance scheme. Fourth, the non-negativity constraints
(NNC) restrict the social planner to allocate non-negative amounts of the consumption
good. At t = 0, the planner announces the state-dependent consumption levels and
thereby incentivizes regional bankers to exert effort. I assume that the planner has com-
mitment at t = 1 and hence, will not deviate from the announced consumption levels.
Proposition 1.1 summarizes the solution to this program.
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Proposition 1.1 (Second Best Allocation).
∃ N̄ ∈ [1,∞): If N ≤ N̄ , then planner achieves first best allocation. If N > N̄ , then
optimal risk sharing allocation depends on aggregate production m and the agency




N +mAH + (N −m)AL
N + (γ − 1)m , c
(m)
L =
N +mAH + (N −m)AL




(N −m)(1 + AH − γ(1 + AL))
N + (γ − 1)m , t
(m)
L =
m(1 + AH − γ(1 + AL))
N + (γ − 1)m (1.12)
T (m) = m(N −m)(1 + AH − γ(1 + AL))
N + (γ − 1)m (1.13)











The first part of Proposition 1.1 shows that for a sufficiently small number of regions
in the insurance scheme (N ≤ N̄), the first best allocation can be achieved even with
unobservable banker effort. This is due to the fact that in the presence of only a few other
other regions, regional bankers internalize the impact of their regional decision on total
production. If, however, the number of regions is sufficiently large (N > N̄), then regional
bankers try to free-ride on each others’ efforts which leads to an underprovision of effort
if regions are fully insured. I will focus on this case. The second part of Proposition 1.1
reveals that the central planner responds to the moral hazard problem by creating an
agency wedge between the consumption level if the region has high output and the
consumption level if the region has low output. This implies that the planner only
partially insures regions in order to provide incentives, thereby mitigating the moral
hazard problem.
Importantly, the agency wedge is independent of the realized aggregate output m. This
implies that the central planner distorts the first best allocation equally in all potential
states of the world.9 While aggregate production does not influence the agency wedge,
it directly influences the risk sharing allocation. More specifically, both c(m)H and c
(m)
L are
increasing in aggregate production m. That is, the more aggregate production there is,
9The size of this distortion depends on the number of regions N , banker effort cost k, the probability
of a high shock q, production levels AL and AH , and the consumer’s risk aversion η. The agency wedge
increases in k and N . The comparative statics with respect to the other parameters are ambiguous for
the general CRRA case.
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the higher the consumption levels assigned to each region. Figure 1.2 illustrates the first
and second best risk sharing allocation as a function of aggregate production m.



























Figure 1.2: First and second best allocation
Note: First and second best consumption levels as a function of aggregate production m for N = 12,
q = 0.8, k = 0.05, AL = 1, AH = 1.5, η = 2. The agency wedge is given by γ = 1.147. The first best
allocation is depicted in blue. It is such that each region consumes an equal share of total production
for all m. The social planner implements the second best allocation by creating a wedge between regional
consumption in case of high output and regional consumption in case of low output. Second best transfers
per region are given by the vertical distance between production and consumption levels (illustrated here
for m = 4).







= 1.147. That is, for every realization of aggregate production m, the social plan-
ner distorts the allocation such that regions with high output consume 14.7% more than
regions with low output (compared to a difference of 20% between consumption with
high output and consumption with low output in the case of no insurance between re-
gions). The figure illustrates that transfers per high output region are decreasing in m
while transfer per low output region are increasing in m. The next corollary shows that
total resource transfers implied by the second best allocation are inversely U-shaped in
aggregate production m.
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Corollary 1.1 (Second Best Total Resource Transfers).
Total real resource transfers T = m · t(m)H are increasing for low values of aggregate











Ceteris paribus, total resource transfers are decreasing in γ.
The total size of real resource transfers is determined by both the number of regions in
high state (extensive margin) and the transfer per region in high state (intensive margin):
T = m · t(m)H . The number of regions in high state is increasing in m while the transfer
per region in high state, t(m)H , is decreasing in m. The extensive margin effect of m on
total transfers is dominating for small values of m while the intensive margin effect is
dominating for large values of m.
1.4 Risk Sharing Through Common Currency
In this section, I show how the constrained efficient allocation can be implemented in the
decentralized economy through a common currency which is managed by the central bank.
In section 1.4.1, I outline the monetary environment of the decentralized economy. The
argument for risk sharing through a common currency then proceeds in three steps. In
section 1.4.2, I discuss the balance of payments within the currency union. This subsection
shows that the common currency allows for current account imbalances between member
regions which are refinanced through the central bank. The key insight is that the
rate at which the central bank monetizes the endowment good determines the amount
of real resources transferred between regions through the use of the common currency.
In section 1.4.3, I derive optimal policy rates for a central bank striking the balance
between insurance and incentives from the common currency. In section 1.4.4, I show
that real resource transfers through central bank refinance of current account imbalances
are equivalent to fiscal transfers in a fiscal union. I conclude that risk sharing through
the common currency is based on an unequal distribution of implicit seigniorage revenue.
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1.4.1 Monetary Environment
Similar to Allen et al. [2014], I assume that all transactions in the decentralized economy
are intermediated by money.10 Money is exclusively created by a central bank. At t = 0,
the central bank lends one unit of currency to each regional banker against his endowment
good (’safe asset’). This implies that total money supply at t = 0 is given by M ≡∑N
i=1Mi = N . Regional bankers lend the money to regional firms. Regional firms use the
money to buy labor from the regional consumer. At t = 1, after productivity shocks have
realized, regional firms sell their output on an economy-wide goods market, and forward
all revenue to their regional banker. Regional bankers that cannot repay their central
bank loans have to refinance their deficit.11 The central bank sets a real resource price
rCB at which it provides additional money at t = 1 to cover deficits. More specifically,
the central bank requires rCB units of endowment goods per unit of money deficit from
a region with net money outflows. This implies that 1
rCB
is the rate at which the central
bankmonetizes the endowment good at t = 1 to cover one unit of net money flows between
regions.
Definition 1.2 (Monetary Policy).
The central bank chooses a real rate rCB at which it provides money at t = 1:
rCB =
endowment goods
unit of deficit with central bank (1.15)
Equivalently, 1
rCB
is the rate at which the central bank monetizes the endowment good.
The central bank transfers the endowment goods obtained from regions with a net money
deficit to regions with a net money surplus. That is, the central bank effectively controls
the real value (in terms of endowment goods) of a net money flow between any two
regions. At the end of t = 1, after debt has been settled using endowment goods, the
central bank redistributes all remaining endowment goods back to regions in equal shares.
The central bank’s objective function is the expected utility of a region at t = 0 before
productivity shocks are realized. That is, the central bank has a utilitarian welfare







1− η − k · ei
)]
(1.16)
10I use the terms money and currency interchangeably.
11This assumption could be rationalized in a dynamic model in which the central bank requires regions
to repay their loans to stay in the currency union.
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Figure 1.3 summarizes the timeline of events in the monetary economy.
t = 0 t = 1
banker effort
regional shocks






Figure 1.3: Timeline (monetary economy in red)
1.4.2 Balance of Payments and Monetary Policy in a Currency Union
At t = 0, the central bank creates a total of ∑Ni Mi = N units of money. These nominal
balances are held by regional consumers who exchange their labor endowment against
money. Aggregate production in the currency union is given by Y (m) = mAH+(N−m)AL
where m denotes the number of regions with high banker effort and a high productivity
shock. Regional firms sell their output on the economy-wide goods market. The economy-
wide goods market clears according to the quantity equation which implies that the
equilibrium price level is given by





mAH + (N −m)AL
(1.17)
As each regional consumer holds the same amount of currency (Mi = 1), each consumer















(mAH + (N −m)AL) (1.18)
That is, goods market clearing implies that the different regional consumers obtain the
same amount of goods from the goods market irrespective of their regional production
levels. This implies that there is a flow of goods from regions with high output levels
to regions with low output levels which is accompanied by a flow of money in opposite
direction. Lemma 1.2 summarizes these flows.
Lemma 1.2 (Regional Balance of Payments).
Assume the aggregate state of the economy is given by m. Goods market clearing implies
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< 0, NET (m)L =
m(AL − AH)





(N −m)(AH − AL)
N
> 0, NET (m)H =
(N −m)(AH − AL)
mAH + (N −m)AL
> 0 (1.20)
where CA(m)i = NETiP with i ∈ {L,H} denotes a country’s current account balance, and
NET
(m)
i denotes its net money inflow. It holds that m ·CA
(m)
H + (N −m) ·CA
(m)
L = 0 as
well as m ·NET (m)H + (N −m) ·NET
(m)
L = 0.
Each regional banker obtains Mi = 1 units of money from the central bank at t = 0. The
regional consumer uses this money on the goods market at t = 1 to buy output. This
implies that each region has a gross outflow of money equal toMi = 1. This gross outflow
of money is met by a gross inflow of money from regional firms selling their output to
consumers on the economy-wide goods market. This implies that the net money inflow
to region i is given by
NET
(m)









That is, region i has a net money inflow if its firms produce more output than the average
region. On the contrary, the region has a net money outflow if it produces less output
than the average region. In the following, it will be convenient to summarize total net
money flows in the economy by one variable, NET (m).
Definition 1.3 (Net Outstanding Claims Between Regions).
Let NET (m) denote the total amount of outstanding nominal claims between regions after
the goods market has cleared. It is given by
NET (m) ≡ mNET (m)H = −(N −m)NET
(m)
L (1.22)
Proposition 1.2 shows that net money flows are the result of missing exchange rates
between different regions in the currency union.
Proposition 1.2 (Missing Exchange Rates and Money Flows).
Let Pi (Pj) is the (hypothetical) price level that would have materialized in region i (j) if
it was not part of the currency union. A net money flow from region i to region j implies
that Pi > Pj or Yi < Yj, respectively.
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If each region had issued its own currency, the equilibrium of the economy would feature
exchange rates between different currencies which depend on country-specific production
levels (see section 1.6.2). Net money flows between regions reflect the absence of these
exchange rates.
Risk sharing through the common currency crucially depends on how these net money
flows are refinanced by the central bank. Net flows appear on the central bank level and
imply that regions with a net money outflow will not be able to repay their central bank
loan from t = 0. Regions can refinance their deficit with the central bank at the real
rate rCB. More specifically, the central bank offers to convert rCB units of endowment
goods into one unit of currency. Note that in equilibrium, the nominal value of rCB units
of endowment goods is given by P (m) · rCB. If the central bank offers to refinance a net
money deficit of NET (m)L for a total of rCBNET
(m)
L amount of endowment goods, then it
refinances a fraction P (m) ·rCB ’at market rate’, and a fraction 1−P (m) ·rCB ’below market
rates’. That is,
(




L is money created in excess of the nominal value
of the endowment good to refinance net money flows. It is the result of monetizing the
endowment good ’above market rate’ P (m).12
Lemma 1.3 (Market versus Central Bank Refinance).
At the rate rCB, a deficit region refinances a fraction P (m)·rCB of its money deficit through
other regions (’at market rate’), and the remaining fraction 1 − P (m) · rCB through the
central bank (’below market rate’):
NET
(m)




+ (1− P (m) · rCB) ·NET (m)L︸ ︷︷ ︸
’central bank refinance’
(1.23)
If the central bank allows a deficit region to cover its deficit at a real resource price of
rCB · NET (m)L , then this implies a transfer of the corresponding amount of endowment
goods from deficit regions to surplus regions. At the goods market price level P (m), this
resource transfer recovers a fraction P (m) ·rCB of a deficit region’s net money deficit. The
remaining fraction 1 − P (m) · rCB of the deficit is covered by the central bank through
overdraft balances.
12Note that refinancing net money flows ’below market rate’ 1
P (m)
is equivalent to monetizing endow-
ment goods ’above market rate’ P (m).
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Definition 1.4 (Central Bank Overdraft Balance).
An overdraft balance is created at t = 1 to cover net money flows between regions which
are not refinanced at market rate 1
P (m)
.
Corollary 1.2 (Overdraft Balances).
The total amount of overdraft balances created by the central bank is given by
B(m) ≡ (1− P (m) · rCB) ·NET (m) (1.24)
If rCB < 1P (m) , then a fraction 1 − P
(m) · rCB of a deficit region’s total money outflow
NET
(m)
L will be financed through an overdraft balance at the central bank. This implies
that part of the net inflow of a surplus region will be converted into an overdraft balance.
Only the remaining part of net money flows will have to be refinanced at the market
rate 1
P (m)
. Note that every positive overdraft balance (of a deficit region) is met with a
negative overdraft balance (of a surplus region). As a result, the net amount of overdraft
balances is always equal to 0.
Corollary 1.3 (Current Account Finance through the Central Bank).















− rCB ·NET (m)H = (1− P · rCB)CAH =
B(m)
(N −m)P (m) (1.26)
Corollary 1.3 shows that the real value of overdraft balances represents the fraction of
current account imbalances that are refinanced below market rates through the central
bank. I conclude this subsection with the following definition of a monetary equilibrium
with a common currency.
Definition 1.5 (Monetary Equilibrium with Common Currency and Monetary Policy).
Given the realization of aggregate production riskm and monetary policy variables {M, r(m)CB },
a monetary equilibrium with a common currency consists of regional banker effort levels
(e1, e2, ..., en), production levels (y1, y2, ..., yn), price level P (m), net money flows NET (m),
overdraft balances B(m), and consumption levels (c(m)1 , c
(m)
2 , ..., c
(m)
n ) such that regional
bankers maximize (ex-ante) household utility and the economy-wide goods markets clears.
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1.4.3 Optimal Risk Sharing Through the Common Currency
If rCB = 1P (m) , then a deficit region has to cover its current account deficit resulting from
goods market clearing with a corresponding amount of endowment goods. This implies
that, at t = 1, the central bank monetizes the endowment good at market rates which
leaves the individual region fully exposed to its idiosyncratic productivity shock. Hence,
the central bank can achieve risk sharing only if rCB < 1P (m) , i.e. if it monetizes the
endowment good above market rates.
Proposition 1.3 (Risk-Sharing Monetary Policy).






and B(m) > 0. The higher the monetary policy rate rCB, the lower the
risk sharing through the common currency.
In this model, monetary policy is described by the real refinance rate rCB and the amount
of overdraft balances B(m) created. The goods market value of money in equilibrium is
given by P (m). If the central bank monetizes endowment goods above the market rate
of P (m), then it achieves risk sharing between the member regions of the currency union.
The central bank finances part of a region’s current account deficits from goods market
clearing through the creation of overdraft balances. That is, it devalues the real claims
a surplus region holds against a deficit region, thereby enabling a real resource transfer
from surplus regions to deficit regions. It is through these real resource transfers that
regions within the currency union smooth consumption profiles and thereby share risks.
The lower the real rate rCB, the higher the fraction of current account deficits that are
financed through the central bank below market rates, and hence, the higher the implied
real resource transfers.
Corollary 1.4 (Full Risk Sharing Monetary Policy).
The central bank implements full risk sharing at rCB = 0. This implies that B(m) =
NET (m).
If the central bank refinances net money flows between regions at zero real cost, then the
full risk sharing allocation is achieved. However, as regional banker effort is unobservable,
full insurance may lead to the underprovision of banker effort and hence suboptimal levels
of aggregate production (m = 0). That is, the problem for the central bank is to choose
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the amount of risk sharing which is compatible with the regional bankers’ incentives to
exert costly effort. The following Proposition derives the optimal refinancing rate rCB
which implements the second best allocation from Proposition 1.1.
Proposition 1.4 (Optimal Monetary Policy).
















where c(m)H and c
(m)
L are the solution from the social planning problem, and P (m) is the
price level on the goods market. Corresponding overdraft balances are given by
B(m) = P (m) (N −m)m [1 + AH − γ(1 + AL)]
N + (γ − 1)m (1.28)
The optimal refinancing rate rCB is always less than the real value of money on the goods
market which is given by 1
P (m)
. That is, the central bank provides insurance through the
common currency by refinancing net money flows ’below market rates’, or equivalently,
by monetizing the endowment good ’above market rates’. Proposition 1.4 shows that the
optimal refinancing rate rCB depends on both the agency wedge γ as well as the realized
aggregate production m. Note that if c(m)H = c
(m)
L ∀m, then the optimal policy rate is
given by rCB = 0 ∀m. This implies perfect risk sharing. If c(m)H = 1 + AH ∀m and
c
(m)
L = 1 + AL ∀m, then rCB = 1P (m) . This implies no risk sharing.
With N regions in the currency union there are N+1 potential realizations of aggregate
production, and optimal monetary policy specifies a policy rate rCB for N − 1 of them
(there are no money flows between regions for m = 0 and m = N and hence no role
for monetary policy). Importantly, the central bank will not be able to implement the
second best allocation if it commits to one policy rate for all potential states of the world.
Corollary 1.5 summarizes this observation.
Corollary 1.5 (Optimal Monetary Policy is State-Contingent).







That is, for each realization of the aggregate production, the central bank sets a distinct
policy rate.
At t = 0, the central bank implements the second best risk sharing allocation by announc-
ing refinancing rates which depend on the realization of aggregate production at t = 1.
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The announced refinance rate schedule is such that regional bankers are incentivized to
exert effort. Providing incentives comes at the cost of only partial insurance against
production risks. The implementation of the second best allocation in the decentralized
economy requires the central bank to have full commitment to its announced refinance
rates. In Section 1.6.1, I analyze how commitment can be guaranteed through the design
of decision making within the central bank.
The next Proposition establishes the comparative statics of optimal monetary policy.
Proposition 1.5 (Comparative Statics of Optimal Monetary Policy).
The optimal monetary policy rate rCB is increasing in both the agency wedge γ and
aggregate production m.
Optimal monetary policy is driven by two considerations. First, for any given aggregate
output level m, the central bank needs to implement the agency wedge γ in order to
provide incentives. The higher the agency wedge γ, the more the central bank distorts the
allocation away from perfect risk sharing. As a result, the optimal rate rCB is increasing
in the agency wedge γ. Second, for any given agency wedge γ, the central bank changes
its policy rate in response to changes in aggregate production m. More specifically, the
second best allocation implies that the consumption of a region in low state is increasing
in aggregate production m. This requires larger current account finance through the
central bank, i.e. a reduction in rCB. As a result, lower values for m imply lower values
for rCB in optimum. Corollary 1.6 summarizes this observation.
Corollary 1.6 (Optimal Policy over the Cycle).
The optimal policy rate rCB is increasing in aggregate production m. Optimal overdraft
balances B are non-monotone in aggregate production m: They increase in m for small
values of m, and decrease in m for large value of m.
Figure 1.4 illustrates both optimal policy rates rCB as well as optimal overdraft balances as
a function of aggregate production m. The figure shows that the central bank optimally
increases its policy rate as aggregate production increases. Further, the total amount
of overdraft balances created, B, is non-monotonic. The non-monotonicity of B with
respect to aggregate production m is explained by the tension between fewer regions in
need of transfers as m increases, and more transfers per region as m increases. More
specifically, lower values of m imply larger balances for each country with low output
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Figure 1.4: Optimal policy rate r(m)CB , optimal overdraft balances B(m), and market rate
1
P (m)
Note: Model is parameterized with q = 0.8, k = 0.05, AL = 1, AH = 1.5, η = 2, and N = 12. The
optimal policy rate (in blue) is increasing in aggregate production m to provide insurance through the
common currency. Optimal overdraft balances (in brown) are inversely U-shaped due to the tension
between more balances per region in low states (intensive margin) and the number of regions in low state
as m increases (extensive margin). The market rate 1P (in red) is monotonically decreasing in aggregate
production m as money supply is independent of m.
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(intensive margin). However, as the number of countries with low output decreases in
m, this increase in balance per country is counteracted by a decrease in the number of
countries with a balance (extensive margin). For small values of m, the intensive margin
effect dominates the extensive margin effect (and B increases in m), and vice versa for
high values of m (and B decreases in m).
1.4.4 Equivalence between Monetary Policy and Fiscal Transfers
Overdraft balances allow the central bank of the currency union to share consumption
risks between different member states. In this subsection, I show that these overdraft
balances are the result of the unequal distribution of implicit seigniorage revenue created
through the central bank’s policies at t = 1. Further, I demonstrate that any risk
sharing allocation obtained through the common currency can be obtained through fiscal
transfers.
To see the connection to seigniorage more clearly, note that at t = 0, the central bank
creates a total of M units of money. The real value of this money at t = 1, VM , depends
on its goods market value as well as its refinance value. More specifically, the value on
the goods market is equal to 1
P (m)
while its refinance value is rCB. Thus, the real value






























That is, if rCB = 1P (m) , then a net money flow between regions has the same real value
as it has on the goods market. If rCB < 1P (m) , however, then the value of a net money
flow between regions is less than the real value of money on the goods market. Thus, the
real value of money balances created at t = 0 is reduced by the central bank’s refinancing
policy at t = 1 if rCB < 1P (m) . The central bank determines the nominal value of the
endowment good at t = 1. The market nominal value is given by P (m), but the central
bank can attach a value higher than that. The central bank’s privilege of being the sole
provider of currency in the economy means that it can monetize endowment goods above
market rates, thereby devaluing net money flows between regions. The real value of this
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devaluation is given by the real value of overdraft balances which is B(m)
P (m)
. I refer to the
real value of overdraft balances as implicit seigniorage revenue.
Definition 1.6 (Seigniorage Revenue).
The central bank’s seigniorage revenue S(m) from refinancing operations at the end of the
period is given by S(m) = B(m)
P (m)
= B(m) Y (m)
N
.
Seigniorage revenue is a fraction B(m) of average output in the economy. Proposition 1.6
derives the seigniorage revenue required to implement the second best allocation.
Proposition 1.6 (Optimal Seigniorage Revenue).





= (N −m)m [1 + AH − γ(1 + AL)]
N + (γ − 1)m (1.31)
The total seigniorage revenue accrues to regions in a low state. Total seigniorage revenue
is increasing in m for small m and decreasing in m for large m.
The seigniorage proceeds through the buildup of overdraft balances are fully distributed
to regions with a net money deficit at t = 1. That is, the real resource transfer required
to achieve the second best allocation is implemented through an uneven distribution of
seigniorage revenue among regions. The required seigniorage revenue is largest for inter-
mediate values of aggregate production m. The reason for this is similar to the logic for
total balances. Larger values of m lead to lower real transfers required for each country
with low output (intensive margin). At the same time, however, larger values of m imply
fewer regions with low output (extensive margin). The first effect dominates the second
for low values of m, while the second effect dominates the first for large values of m. This
implies that the total amount of seigniorage revenue is largest for an intermediate value
of m.
To shed further light on the quasi-fiscal effects of monetary policy in this model, con-
sider the case of a fiscal union without any monetary transactions. Assume that the
fiscal authority can transfer real resources between different regions through taxes and
transfers.
Definition 1.7 (Fiscal Policy).
The fiscal authority sets a tax rate t ∈ (0, 1) on output produced in the economy, and
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redistributes the tax revenue T ≡ t [N +mAH + (N −m)AL] back to regions. A fraction
θ of total tax revenue goes to regions with low output, and a fraction 1− θ to regions with
high output.
The fiscal union effectively sets up an ex post risk-sharing arrangement. The following
Proposition shows that the fiscal authority can achieve the same allocation through taxes
and transfers as the central bank through its choice of the real refinancing rate.
Proposition 1.7 (Equivalence to Fiscal Transfers).
The fiscal authority implements the second best allocation by taxing all output at rate
t(m) = (N −m) [1 + AH − γ(1 + AL)](1 + AH) [N + (γ − 1)m]
(1.32)
and redistributing all revenue to regions with low output. It holds that t(m) ·m(1 +AH) =
S(m).
Optimal fiscal policy is described by a tax rate which depends on the realization of aggre-
gate production risk, m. That is, just like optimal monetary policy, optimal fiscal policy
is state dependent. Importantly, Proposition 1.7 shows that the second best allocation
can be achieved through a fiscal authority that effectively taxes regions in high state and
transfers the tax revenue to regions in low state. The so-obtained real resource transfer
between regions is exactly equal to the seigniorage revenue S(m) generated through the
central bank in a currency union.
Thus, a fiscal authority in a fiscal union is able to use the tax-transfer system to achieve
the same allocation achieved by the central bank in a monetary union through monetary
policy. I conclude that the central bank’s refinancing decisions are quasi-fiscal. They im-
ply real resource transfers between different regions as they distribute implicit seigniorage
revenue to regions with low output.
1.5 TARGET Balances: The Common Currency Channel in Action
Section 1.4 established three main results. First, a common currency is able to insure
union members against idiosyncratic production risks, thereby achieving consumption
risk sharing. Second, potential moral hazard problems of such an insurance scheme can
be addressed through a central bank which strikes the balance between insurance and
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incentives through its policy decisions. Third, the central bank sets the policy rate ac-






CB ) which depends on aggregate production
m. As the number of regions with high output decreases (lower m), the central bank
responds with a decrease in its policy rate rb, i.e. r(m−1)CB < r
(m)
CB . This reduction in refi-
nancing rates leads to a buildup of overdraft balances B. These balances are a symptom
of risk sharing through the common currency.
In this section, I argue that the European Central Bank (ECB) provided risk sharing
through the common currency during the Eurocrisis from 2008 to 2014. Section 1.5.1
interprets the accumulation of TARGET debt within the Eurosystem as risk sharing
through the common currency.13 TARGET balances are equivalent to central bank over-
draft balances B in my model. In section 1.5.2, I construct a counterfactual exercise to
calculate the real resource transfers between the different Eurozone countries achieved
through TARGET flows. Section 1.5.3 follows the approach pioneered in Asdrubali et al.
[1996] to estimate the contribution of "TARGET transfers" to total risk sharing within
the Eurosystem.
1.5.1 Balance of Payment and TARGET Balances
The balance of payment identity for an individual country is given by
CA+ FA+OB = 0 (1.33)
where CA denotes the current account balance, FA is the financial account balance, and
OB is the official settlement balance. The latter represents the change in a country’s
foreign reserves (foreign currency and gold), and it is close to zero if a country is part of
a flexible exchange rate regime (like the Eurozone with the rest of the world). Therefore,
in the Eurozone, it holds that OB ≈ 0. The balance of payment for each member country
equals14
CA+ FA+ T = 0 (1.34)
where T denote TARGET flows. TARGET stands for "Trans-European Automated
Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System" which is the real-time gross set-
tlement (RTGS) system for the Eurozone. That is, current account deficits of a Eurozone
13TARGET2 replaced TARGET in 2007. I use the terms interchangeably.
14See Merler and Pisani-Ferry [2012] and Higgins and Klitgaard [2014] for a description of balance of
payments within a currency union.
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country are either financed through private capital flows (FA) or through the TARGET
system. The TARGET system allows any Eurozone country to borrow from their na-
tional central bank to wire funds to another Eurozone country using eligible collateral.15
Collateral requirements allow the ECB to monetize assets above market rates. Financing
current account deficits through the financial account, on the other hand, implies selling
assets at market prices. Using the notation from my model it holds that, for an individual
Eurozone country with a current account deficit, CAL = NETLP , T = −(1−P ·rCB)NETL,
and FA = −P · rCB ·NETL where NETL < 0. Figure 1.5 shows that during the Eurocri-
sis between 2008 and 2014, TARGET balances within the Eurozone grew substantially.
Periphery countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) accumulated large negative
TARGET balances with Core countries (Germany, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland).
Furthermore, as Figure 1.6 shows, these TARGET balances arose while at the same
time Periphery countries maintained current account deficits. Contrasting the official set-
tlement balance in eq. (1.33) with the TARGET flows in eq. (1.34) suggests that, without
the common currency, Periphery countries would have run down their foreign reserves in
order to maintain current account deficits with Core countries. However, eventually the
national central banks would have run out of foreign reserves, and the current account
would have had to adjust. The TARGET system prevented this rundown of foreign re-
serves as it gave Periphery countries potentially unlimited access to foreign reserves. The
limits to this access were defined by the ECB which enabled the buildup of these large
TARGET balances through its policy decisions as Table 1.1 demonstrates.
Table 1.1 summarizes some of the most important changes in the ECB’s refinancing
policy during the Eurocrisis. Before the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, the ECB
auctioned limited amounts of central bank money short-term to commercial banks against
high-quality collateral. During the course of the Eurocrisis, the ECB gradually changed
its refinancing policies towards unlimited amounts of central bank money (’full allotment
policy’) which were lent long-term (LTRO operations) against low-quality collateral (re-
duced rating requirements). All in all, the measures taken by the ECB provided cheap
refinancing credit to banks in Periphery countries that suffered from a reversal of private
capital flows.
15See Bindseil and König [2011], Whelan [2014], and Tornell [2018] for a more detailed description of
the TARGET system.
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Figure 1.5: TARGET Balances in the Eurosystem
Note: TARGET balances measure intra-Eurozone net currency flows. If a country has a positive TAR-
GET balance, this country had more inflow of currency from other countries than currency outflow to
other countries. Similarly, negative TARGET balances indicate a net outflow of the common currency.
TARGET balances represent the overdraft balances introduced in the theoretical section. Figure reproduced
from eurocrisimonitor.com at the Institute of Empirical Economic Research (Osnabrueck University).
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Figure 1.6: Current Account Balances of Periphery Countries (in % of GDP)
Note: All Periphery countries had current account deficit at the onset of the Eurocrisis in 2008. During
the following years, these countries adjusted their current account imbalances and, apart from Greece,
had reverted a current account deficit into a surplus by 2013. I argue that TARGET balances allowed for
a gradual adjustment of current account imbalances instead of an abrupt adjustment which would have
been likely without the common currency. Data from the OECD.
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Date Policy measure
15 October 2008 Full allotment policy
25 October 2008 Minimum rating of collateral reduced from single A to triple B
30 October 2008 Maturity of LTROsa extended to six months
1 February 2009 Acceptance of government guaranteed own-use bonds as collateral
23 June 2009 First of three LTRO tenders with a maturity of 12 months
6 May 2010 Rating requirement waived for bonds issued or guaranteed by Greece
1 April 2011 Rating requirement waived for bonds issued or guaranteed by Ireland
7 July 2011 Rating requirement waived for bonds issued or guaranteed by Portugal
21 December 2011 First of two LTRO tenders with a maturity of 3 years
29 June 2012 Lowering of rating requirement to triple B for all ABSb
Table 1.1: Changes in ECB Refinancing Policy (taken from Sinn [2014])
Note: The table shows some of the most important changes in refinancing policies taken by the
European Central Bank during the period 2008-2013. The ECB moved away from a policy of
lending against good collateral towards lending against low quality collateral. In the language of
the model presented earlier, I interpret these changes as a decrease in the real refinancing rate rCB.
aLong-Term Refinancing Operations
bAsset-backed securities
Sinn [2014] refers to the policy measures taken by the ECB as "help from the printing
press" (p. 153). In light of the analysis presented in section 1.4, I interpret these measures
as the ECB providing risk sharing through the common currency. In the absence of effec-
tive traditional risk sharing channels (credit market, capital market or fiscal transfers),
the ECB partially insured Periphery countries against the adverse effects of their negative
shocks on consumption.16 In the language of my model, the change in ECB refinancing
policies in Table 1.1 reflect a decrease in the real refinancing rate rCB. This decrease
of the real refinancing rate resulted in large TARGET balances which mirror overdraft
balances in my model. That is, the ECB monetized assets at a higher than market rate,
16In addition to these refinancing policy changes by the ECB, national central banks within the
Eurosystem were allowed to grant assistance to commercial banks within the ELA (’Emergency Liquidity
Assistance’) program. This program has been used mostly by Greece, Ireland, and Cyprus. See Sinn
[2014].
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and thus provided money to Periphery countries through the TARGET system which
helped to refinance current account deficits at a real rate lower than the market rate.17
1.5.2 Quantifying "TARGET Transfers"
To quantify the amount of real resource transfers through the TARGET system, I conduct
the following counterfactual exercise for Eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain)
from 2002 - 2014.18
1. For each country, I determine the amount of current account deficit financed through
TARGET flows using the balance of payment identity. That is, if CA < 0, then
min{1, ∆T
CA
} measures the fraction of current account deficits financed through an
increase in TARGET imbalances.
2. Assume that without the TARGET flows, the country’s current account balance
would have improved one for one.19
3. Assume that if a country reduces its current account deficit, it does so by cutting
back on its imports. This leads to a reduction of exports for each import partner.
Trade partners are affected proportionally to their import trade share.20
4. Calculate adjusted current account balances for all countries in the panel. "TARGET
transfers" are the difference between actual current account balances and adjusted
17Strictly speaking, TARGET balances are credit between countries secured by collateral used in the
central bank’s refinancing operations. In my model, this decrease in collateral requirements is a real
resource transfer between countries. Technically, the real resource transfer only materializes if a country
defaults on its debt and the creditor country seizes the collateral. Imposing probabilities of default would
allow to interpret the decrease in collateral requirements as an (expected) real resource transfer between
countries.
18See Appendix B.1. for data source description.
19It is not straightforward to predict how current account balances of Periphery countries would
have evolved without the TARGET system. Edwards [2004] shows in a cross-country panel that capital
account reversal are typically accompanied by instant current account reversal. See also Cecchetti and
Schoenholtz [2018] who show that during the Asian crisis, the current account balance of the ASEAN-5
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) increased from about -3% of GDP in 1997
to around +7% of GDP in 1998.
20That is, if country A has to reduce its current account deficit by ex and y% of its imports stem
from country B, then country B will see a reduction of its exports by e y/100 · x.
34
1 THE COMMON CURRENCY CHANNEL OF RISK SHARING
current account balances.
Table 1.2 presents the fraction of the current account deficit financed through TARGET
balances and the implied TARGET transfers (in % of GDP) for the Periphery coun-
tries during selected years of the Eurocrisis. Effectively, the current account adjustments
lead to a redistribution of consumption between the different Eurozone countries in each
period. Since it holds that current account balance = domestic saving – domestic in-
vestment, a decrease in the current account deficit implies an increase in (net) domestic
savings, while an increase in the current account deficit implies a decrease in (net) domes-
tic savings. This implies that, in this counterfactual exercise, a country with a current
account deficit partly financed by TARGET flows will see a reduction in consumption
while a country with a current account surplus which is partly paid for via TARGET
will see an increase in consumption. That is, some countries will see positive TARGET
transfers while others will see negative TARGET transfers.
As Table 1.2 illustrates, the implicit consumption transfers to Periphery countries
through TARGET balances during the peak of the Eurocrisis (2008-2012) were sub-
stantial. For example, Greece obtained an implicit transfer through TARGET flows of
e2741 per person in 2009 and of e2302 in 2010. These are 9.7% and 11.2% of GDP per
capita, respectively. Similarly, Ireland obtained a consumption transfer per person equal
to e2374 in 2008 and e1663 in 2009 (5.7% and 4.2% of GDP per capita, respectively).
Portugal enjoyed a consumption transfer through TARGET of e1742 per person in 2010
and e941 in 2011 (9.6% and 5.4% of GDP per capita, respectively).21
21TARGET transfers for Core countries are reported in Appendix B.2.
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Country Year CA financed through
TARGET (% of CA)
Implied TARGET
Transfer (% of GDP)
Portugal 2008 23.5% 2.1%
Portugal 2009 23.3% 2%
Portugal 2010 100% 9.6%
Portugal 2011 100% 5.5%
Portugal 2012 100% 1.7%
Italy 2010 55.7% 1.6%
Italy 2011 100% 2.8%
Italy 2012 100% 0.2%
Ireland 2008 100% 5.7%
Ireland 2009 100% 4.3%
Ireland 2010 100% 0.6%
Ireland 2011 100% 1.1%
Greece 2008 18.3% 2.7%
Greece 2009 78.5% 9.7%
Greece 2010 100% 11.2%
Greece 2011 70.6% 6.9%
Greece 2012 100% 3.8%
Spain 2008 35.6% 3.0%
Spain 2009 40.1% 1.5%
Spain 2010 57% 1.4%
Spain 2011 45.8% 0.8%
Spain 2012 100% 0.09%
Table 1.2: Implied TARGET Transfer for Periphery during Eurocrisis
Note: The table shows the fraction of current account deficits that were refinanced through changes
in TARGET balances for Periphery countries between 2008 and 2012. These fractions are calculated
using the Balance-of-Payments identity: CA + FA + T = 0. If a country has a current account deficit
(CA < 0) and an increase in TARGET deficits at the same time (T > 0), then refinance of current
account deficits through TARGET balances account for a fraction min{1, TCA} of current account deficits.
Implied TARGET transfers are calculated by reducing the current account deficit by the fraction which
is financed through TARGET balances.
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Figure 1.7 illustrates the significance of TARGET transfers for consumption smoothing in
Periphery countries. It contrasts the difference between real per capita consumption with
the actual current account balances and real per capita consumption with the adjusted
current account balances. Countries are grouped into ’Core’ and ’Periphery’ countries,
and the figure shows the average real per capita consumption levels for these two groups.
The solid lines in the figure represent the average real per capita consumption levels
during the years 2002 and 2014 as they appear in the data, and the dashed lines repre-
sent the adjusted consumption levels without TARGET transfers obtained through the
counterfactual exercise described above.
Figure 1.7: Resource Transfers through TARGET
Note: The figure shows the actual real per-capita consumption levels of Core countries (blue) and Pe-
riphery countries (yellow). Subtracting the implied TARGET transfers in each year gives the adjusted
consumption series for Core countries (red) and Periphery countries (violet). The figure shows that
between 2008 and 2012, implied TARGET transfers cushioned the otherwise strong decline in consump-
tion levels for Periphery countries. Core countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Luxembourg, Netherlands. Periphery countries are Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain.
Until 2007, TARGET transfers played virtually no role in financing current account im-
balances. Between 2008 and 2012, however, the TARGET system implied significant
resource transfers from Core to Periphery countries. TARGET transfers allowed Periph-
ery countries to maintain higher current account deficits than would have otherwise been
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the case, thereby smoothing the negative effects of the financial crisis and the implied
economic slowdown on consumption. The figure shows that TARGET transfers turned
insignificant again after 2012. This is the case since Periphery countries had reduced
their current account deficits by then and the TARGET system was no longer used to
finance current account deficits.22
The TARGET system allowed for a smoother reversal in current account deficits than
is usually the case in balance of payment crisis in which a (sudden) reversal of capital
inflows implies an instant reversal in current account deficits.23 In the following subsec-
tion, I will quantify the contribution of the common curreny channel of risk sharing to
total risk sharing among Eurozone countries during the Eurocrisis from 2008-2014.
1.5.3 Risk Sharing through "TARGET Transfers"
The literature on international risk sharing distinguishes three channels of risk sharing.
First, countries can share risk via the cross-ownership of productive assets which is fa-
cilitated by a well-developed capital market (capital market channel). Second, countries
can share risk if they are part of a fiscal union in which a central government can redis-
tribute consumption through the tax-transfer system (fiscal channel). Third, countries
may smooth their consumption through adjustments of their asset portfolio, i.e. through
lending and borrowing on credit markets (credit market channel). The academic consen-
sus is that traditional risk sharing channels are less well-developed in the Eurozone than
in the United States (see Ioannou and Schäfer [2017] for an overview). Previous litera-
ture has established the role of European institutions in improving risk sharing during
the Eurocrisis (Milano et al. [2017] and Cimadomo et al. [2018]) and the role of austerity
programs in reducing the amount of risk sharing (Kalemli-Ozcan et al. [2014]). My ad-
dition to this literature is to quantify the contribution of the common currency channel
22Between 2007 and 2013, Portugal turned its current account deficit of 9.7% of GDP into a surplus
of 1.18% of GDP, Italy turned its deficit of 1.37% of GDP into a surplus of 0.94% of GDP, Ireland turned
its deficit of 6.54% of GDP into a surplus of 1.5% of GDP, Greece reduced its current account deficit
from 15.22% of GDP to 2% of GDP, and Spain turned its deficit of 9.63% of GDP into a surplus of 1.52%
of GDP. See Figure 1.6.
23See Merler and Pisani-Ferry [2012] for a discussion of sudden stops during the Eurocrisis. Edwards
[2004] provides evidence regarding the relationship between sudden stops and current-account reversals
using panel data.
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to total risk sharing.
To test for the quantitative relevance of "TARGET transfer" in providing risk sharing,











where GNI=GDP+net factor income (capital market channel), NI = GNI-capital de-
preciation (capital depreciation channel),24 DNI = NI+international transfers (fiscal
channel), C = DNI-net savings (credit market channel). I add a fifth channel to this
decomposition by introducing Adj.C as the consumption level after adjusting the current
account balances for TARGET finance, i.e. (Adj.C=DNI-net savings-TARGET transfers)













Taking logs and differences on both sides of the equation, multiplying both sides by
∆ logGDP it , and taking the cross-sectional average gives the following variance decom-
position
var{∆ logGDP it } =cov{∆ logGDP it −∆ logGNI it ,∆ logGDP it }
+cov{∆ logGNI it −∆ logNI it ,∆ logGDP it }
+cov{∆ logNI it −∆ logDNI it ,∆ logGDP it }
+cov{∆ logDNI it −∆ logAdj.Cit ,∆ logGDP it }
+cov{∆ logAdj.Cit −∆ logCit ,∆ logGDP it }
+cov{∆ logCit ,∆ logGDP it }
(1.37)
Dividing by var{∆ logGDP it } we get that
1 = βf + βd + βt + βs + βTARGET + βu (1.38)
where
βTARGET =
cov{∆ logAdj.Cit −∆ logCit ,∆ logGDP it }
var{∆ logGDP it }
(1.39)
24Depreciation is calculated according to fixed accounting rules. In the data, the capital-output ratio is
countercyclical which then implies that if GDP is decreasing, capital depreciation will constitute a higher
fraction of GDP. As a result, this channel tends to be dis-smoothing. As this channel is mechanical, it
is usually not given much attention in the literature (Asdrubali et al. [1996] did not include it in their
analysis). See Sørensen and Yosha [1998] for a discussion.
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is the ordinary least square estimate of the slope in the cross-sectional regression of
∆ logAdj.Cit − ∆ logCit on ∆ logGDP it . This approach implies that βu measures the
fraction of GDP shocks which are not smoothed. βf denotes the fraction of shocks to GDP
smoothed through the capital market channel, βd through capital depreciation channel,
βt through the international transfers channel, βs through the credit market channel,
and βTARGET through the common currency channel. βTARGET is thus interpreted as the
fraction of shocks absorbed through TARGET transfers. It measures the incremental
amount of smoothing achieved through the common currency channel.
The following (panel) equations are estimated:
∆ logGDP it −∆ logGNI it = νf,t + βf∆ logGDP it + εf,t (1.40)
∆ logGNI it −∆ logNI it = νd,t + βd∆ logGDP it + εd,t (1.41)
∆ logNI it −∆ logDNI it = νt,t + βt∆ logGDP it + εt,t (1.42)
∆ logDNI it −∆ logAdj.Cit = νs,t + βs∆ logGDP it + εs,t (1.43)
∆ logAdj.Cit −∆ logCit = νT,t + βTARGET∆ logGDP it + εT,t (1.44)
∆ logCit = νf,t + βu∆ logGDP it + εu,t (1.45)
where ν·,t are time fixed effects. The time fixed effects capture year specific impacts
on growth rates, most importantly the impact of growth in aggregate Eurozone output.
The β-coefficients are weighted averages of the year by year cross-sectional regressions,
obtained through OLS estimation. Standard errors are obtained from a two step Gener-
alized Least Square procedure, allowing for autocorrelation in residuals and for country
specific variances of the error terms in the estimation. Table 1.3 reports the results from
the estimation for the entire sample.25
In the entire sample, the TARGET channel was quantitatively not important between
2003 and 2007. During the early stages of the Eurocrisis (2008-2009), the TARGET
channel became quantitatively and statistically significantly important for risk sharing
between Eurozone countries. In fact, in these two years, the channel accounts for around
60% of the consumption smoothing achieved within the Eurozone. Without TARGET
transfers, 75.4% of shocks to GDP would have been unsmoothed, while with TARGET
transfers this number drops to 36.2%.26 After 2009, the channel still has a significant
25Appendix B.3. reports additional results for the subsample of Core and Periphery countries.
26This implies that TARGET transfers contribute to 0.3921−0.362 = 0.614, i.e. 61.4% of total risk sharing
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2003-2007 2008-2009 2010-2014
Factor Income (βf ) 0.334 -0.268 0.007
(0.337) (0.338) (0.073)
Capital Depreciation (βd) 0.026 -0.143 -0.110***
(0.037) (0.160) (0.032)
International Transfers (βt) 0.083 0.078 -0.051
(0.187) (0.075) (0.055)
Savings (βs) 0.222 0.402 0.586***
(0.587) (0.562) (0.088)
TARGET (βTARGET ) 0.064 0.392* -0.251**
(0.090) (0.223) (0.118)
Not Smoothed (βu) 0.272*** 0.362*** 0.804***
(0.087) (0.018) (0.076)
Standard errors are in brackets. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Table 1.3: Risk Sharing Channels: Entire Sample
Note: The table shows the results from performing the regressions in (1.40)-(1.45) for the 12 Eurozone
countries in the sample and for the three different subperiods: before Eurocrisis (2003-2007), first stage
of Eurocrisis (2008-2009), and second stage of Eurocrisis (2010-2014). Each coefficient is interpreted as
the incremental increase in consumption risk sharing through the corresponding channel. Values can be
negative if a channel is dis-smoothing. Values for each time period add up to one.
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impact, but its sign turns negative: TARGET transfers are dis-smoothing between 2010
and 2014. This result is explained by the fact that TARGET transfers are positively
correlated with current account deficits which are positively correlated with GDP in the
data after 2009. This tends to make TARGET transfers countercyclical, especially at
the later stages of the Eurocrisis (2010-2014) where current account deficits are decreas-
ing. More specifically, TARGET transfers are high when a significant amount of current
account deficits are financed through TARGET flows. As Periphery countries reduced
their current account deficits during the Eurocrisis at the same time as these countries
experienced recessions (decrease in GDP), the data shows that the growth in TARGET
transfers is negatively correlated with GDP growth, thus having a dis-smoothing effect.
However, this procyclicality only shows after 2010. In 2008 and 2009, Periphery coun-
tries already experienced a reversal of capital outflows and a significant fraction of their
current account deficits was financed through TARGET balances. During those years,
GDP growth was slowing down which makes TARGET transfers countercyclical, thereby
contributing to risk sharing.
1.6 Extensions
In this section, I extend the model in different ways. First, I address the issue of time
inconsistency of optimal monetary policy. Second, I elaborate on why a monetary en-
vironment with different currencies will not lead to risk sharing. Third, I contrast the
common currency channel of risk sharing with the capital market channel. I establish
that this channel is ineffective in the model economy described in section 1.2.
1.6.1 Central Bank Commitment
As demonstrated in Proposition 1.4, the central bank implements the second best allo-
cation by following a state-contingent schedule for its policy rate rCB. The reason why
the central bank should not always refinance money deficit at zero cost (rCB = 0) is that
this would destroy incentives for reason ex ante to exert effort. Instead, the central bank
provides incentives at t = 0 by announcing its policy rate schedule r(m)CB . However, this
schedule is not necessarily time-consistent. More specifically, if the benevolent central
bank has provided incentives by announcing the optimal schedule, it finds it optimal to
among Eurozone countries in 2008 and 2009.
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perfectly share risks ex post after the regional shock have been realized, i.e. to set rCB = 0
at t = 1 for every possible state of the world. Anticipating this, regional bankers will not
exert effort. Hence, the central bank suffers from a time-inconsistency problem which is
novel to the literature on central bank commitment (see Barro and Gordon [1983] and
Chari and Kehoe [2008] for other examples of central bank time inconsistencies). In the
rest of this subsection, I will show how this commitment problem can be overcome.
As there is one central bank setting the monetary policy rate for many regions, assume
that each region has one vote in determining the central bank policy rate decision. More
specifically, assume that the central bank’s governing council consists of all the regional
bankers in the currency union. Further, assume that regional bankers vote anonymously
over the policy rate schedule r(m)CB and potential deviations from it at the end of every
period t.
Definition 1.8 (Anonymous Voting).
A voting rule F in the central bank council is anonymous if regional bankers are treated
symmetrically: F (R1, ..., Rn) = F (Rπ(1), ..., Rπ(n)) for any profile R and any permutation
π : N→ N.
Under anonymous voting, each regional banker has one vote and each banker’s vote counts
equally towards determining the central bank policy rate. The following Proposition
shows how the central bank’s time-inconsistency problem can be overcome by a proper
design of decision making within the central bank governing council.
Proposition 1.8 (Central Bank Commitment).
Assume that at t = 1, regions have a preference profile R = (R1, ..., Rn) over the policy
parameter rCB and assume that decision making within the central bank follows anony-
mous voting. Then the central bank can overcome its commitment issue if ex post changes
to announced policies require unanimity among union members.
A region with a low productivity shock will want the central bank to decrease its policy
at t = 1 to rCB = 0. On the other hand, a region with a high productivity shock will
want the central bank to increase the policy rate from what was announced at t = 0.
Proposition 1.8 establishes that neither of these two regions will be able to change the
announced policy rate if decisions are to be taken unanimously. This allows the central
bank to overcome its time-inconsistency problem.
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1.6.2 Monetary Equilibrium with Different Currencies
Assume that each region issues its own currency. This implies that there is no central
bank. The equilibrium of the monetary economy with multiple currencies is defined as
follows.
Definition 1.9 (Monetary Equilibrium with Multiple Currencies).
A monetary equilibrium with multiple currencies consists of an aggregate production real-
izationm, regional banker effort levels (e1, e2, ..., en), money creation levels (M1,M2, ...,Mn),
price levels (P1, P2, ..., Pn), and (c1, c2, ..., cn) such that the regional bankers maximize
household utility and the N different goods markets clear.
As regional firms need to pay back loans in their regional currency, the value of the money
issued by regional banker i is ultimately determined by the output produced in region
i. Effectively, with N different currencies, there are N goods markets which clear at N
price levels. Each goods market clears according to the quantity equation:
Mi = YiPi (1.46)







AH if ξi = H and ei = 1
AL if ξi = L or ei = 0
(1.47)
The different regional price levels give rise to real exchange rates between different cur-
rencies. Consider any generic region i and region j. The real exchange rate between





1 if Ai = Aj
AH
AL
> 1 if {Ai, Aj} = {AL, AH}
AL
AH
< 1 if {Ai, Aj} = {AH , AL}
(1.48)
The fact that real exchange rates between different currencies are not equal to 1 for all
states of the world prevents risk sharing between regions. The next subsection shows that
currency swaps as a form of Arrow security trades at t = 0 will not generally be able to
implement the second best allocation due to moral hazard either.
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1.6.3 Capital Market Channel of Risk Sharing
An integrated capital market allows risk sharing through the cross-border ownership of
assets. Consider Arrow security trades as such a risk sharing arrangement. Assume that
at t = 0, regions are allowed to trade claims on each other’s output, thereby diversifying
their idiosyncratic production risk. The following Proposition shows that such Arrow
security trades cannot generally implement the second best allocation.
Proposition 1.9 (Risk Sharing Through Capital Markets).
In the case of unobservable banker effort, ∃ N̄ ∈ [1,∞) such that
1. If security trades are unobservable:
∀N > N̄, Y (m) = NAL ∀m = (0, ..., N), ci = AL ∀i = (0, 1, ..., N) and
∀N ≤ N̄, Y (m) = mAH + (N −m)AL, ci = mAH+(N−m)ALN ∀i = (0, 1, ..., N).
2. If security trades are observable:
Regions trade Arrow securities in groups of N̄ regions in which Y (m) = mAH+(N̄−
m)AL, ci = mAH+(N̄−m)ALN̄ ∀i = (0, 1, ..., N̄)
With unobservable banker effort, regional bankers are inclined to join a risk sharing
coalition consisting of many other regions, and then free-ride on other bankers’ effort. If
security trades are unobservable,27 then regional bankers will do exactly that. This will
lead to an underprovision of effort, all regions end up in the low state and hence, the
risk sharing coalition actually reduces welfare as regional bankers are ’over-diversified’.
If the number of regions is sufficiently small (N ≤ N̄), then regional bankers internalize
their impact on aggregate output and as a result, they will provide effort. Similarly, if
security trades are observable, regions can prevent each other from over-diversifying by
restricting trade to regions which have up to N̄ − 1 trading partners. This ensures that
every region has an incentive to exert effort. However, the risk sharing value of such
small-scale coalitions / security trades is limited (if N̄ is very small, potentially close to
1), and, in general, welfare dominated by a currency union in which the central bank
actively manages the common currency. In a broader sense, Proposition 1.9 implies that
the second best allocation will generally not be achieved through fully-integrated capital
markets in which different regions freely trade assets.
27See Kocherlakota [1998] for a discussion about the role of asset trade observability in an environment
with moral hazard but otherwise complete markets.
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1.7 Conclusion
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, I study the mechanics of risk sharing
through a common currency. Second, I derive rules for a central bank which operates
the common currency channel of risk sharing in the face of moral hazard and aggregate
production risk. Third, I argue that the common currency channel of risk sharing has been
put to practice by the European Central Bank during the Eurocrisis between 2008 and
2014. I show theoretically that a common currency is able to efficiently share consumption
risk between its member countries arising from idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Real
resource transfers through the common currency are based on an unequal distribution of
seigniorage revenue that accrues to the central bank through its refinancing operations.
Optimal monetary policy is determined by (i) a moral hazard problem arising from the
insurance though a common currency and (ii) the realization of aggregate production in
the currency union. The second best risk sharing allocation implies that the central bank
creates an agency wedge to incentivize union members to prevent them from free-riding
on each other’s production effort. Furthermore, optimal monetary policy is described
by a policy rate schedule which implies that the central bank should reduce its real
refinancing rate in response to a negative shock to aggregate production. It is through this
reduction in its policy rate that the central bank provides the optimal amount of insurance
through the common currency. Revisiting the ECB policies during the Eurocrisis, I
show that the common currency channel accounted for up to 60% of total risk sharing
among Euro countries at the early stages of the Eurocrisis. I conclude from this that the
common currency channel is of particular relevance as an insurance mechanism when more
traditional risk sharing channels are not effective or not well developed, as was the case
in the Eurozone before the financial crisis in 2008. The broader point of this paper is that
the central bank of a currency union can share residual risk which is not shared through
the traditional channels of risk sharing via its refinancing operations. Conceptualizing
this notion and studying the trade-offs arising from it are the main contributions of this
paper.
For future work, it seems promising to explicitly include the common currency channel
of risk sharing into the discussion of optimum currency areas. As a first step, it would be
interesting to include heterogeneous regions into the model and study the consequences
for optimal monetary policy. A larger or more productive region internalizes more of
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its impact on aggregate output and hence, it is easier to be incentivized. On the other
hand, smaller or less productive regions are more inclined to free-ride in the presence of
larger regions. It is interesting to study the ideal composition of a currency union which
maximizes the risk sharing value of the common currency. This would allow to address
the question whether the Eurozone is an optimum currency area through the lens of risk
sharing through a common currency. Furthermore, the common currency channel of risk
sharing presented in this paper could be incorporated into a standard New Keynesian
model with price rigidities. In such models, the common currency comes at the cost of
the loss of exchange rates adjustments as shock absorbers which may lead to inefficiencies
in labor market outcomes. Weighing the benefits of consumption risk sharing through
the common currency against the costs of missing price adjustments through exchange
rates allows for a more comprehensive evaluation of optimum currency areas.
1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.1




































H + (N −m)c
(m)
L −N −mAH − (N −m)AL
]
(1.49)
It is obvious that the RC will be binding in optimum. The first-order conditions with
respect to c(m)H and c
(m)
































− µ(m)(N −m) = 0 (1.51)








N +mAH + (N −m)AL
N
∀m = (0, 1, ..., N) (1.52)
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Proof of Proposition 1.1
1. Existence of N̄ : Assume that there is perfect risk sharing between N regions. Then,

























x(m) = N +mAH + (N −m)AL
N
(1.54)




































where the left-hand side is monotonically decreasing in N and approaching 0 for
N → ∞. As k > 0, this implies that ∃N̄ ∈ [1,∞] such that the constraint holds
with equality.
2. Assume that N > N̄ . For the economy with aggregate production risk (finite N),



























































H + (N −m)c
(m)
L −N −mAH − (N −m)AL
]
(1.56)
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are obtained as, ∀m,
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− µ(m)(N −m) = 0 (1.59)
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 ≥ k, (1.61)























Setting λ = 0 (non-binding IC) and µ(m) > 0 (binding RC) leads to perfect risk sharing
which is not an incentive-compatible allocation. Setting µ(m) = 0 (non-binding RC) and
λ > 0 (binding IC) cannot be optimal as the resulting allocation is welfare dominated
by allocating additional output to regions. Setting λ = µ(m) = 0 (neither IC nor RC
bind) can never be optimal for the same reason. Thus, the only solution candidate is
µ(m) > 0 ∀m and λ > 0 such that both RC and IC bind. Combining the first-order



















N +mAH + (N −m)AL




N +mAH + (N −m)AL
N + (γ − 1)m (1.64)
The second-best transfers t(m)H and t
(m)









L − (1 + AL).
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Proof of Lemma 1.2
Let the realization of aggregate production be given by m. Goods market clearing implies
that P (m) = N





units of goods from
the goods market. Then,
CA
(m)





AL − mAH+(N−m)ALN =
m(AL−AH)
N
< 0 if Ai = AL
AH − mAH+(N−m)ALN =
(N−m)(AH−AL)
N





i ≡ P · CA
(m)




mAH+(N−m)AL − 1 =
m(AL−AH)
mAH+(N−m)AL < 0 if Ai = AL
AH
N
mAH+(N−m)AL − 1 =
(N−m)(AH−AL)
mAH+(N−m)AL > 0 if Ai = AH
(1.66)




H + (N −m)NET
(m)
L = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.2
Consider two regions, i and j. Hypothetical price levels are given by Pi = 1yi . In the
currency union, it holds that P = 2
y1+y2 . Net money flows between regions in the currency
union are given by
NETi = P · yi − 1 =
P
Pi
− 1 = P − Pi
Pi
(1.67)
which is greater than zero if Pi < P and less than zero if Pi > P . This condition boils
down to




⇔ y2 < y1 (1.70)
⇔ P2 > P1 (1.71)
Proof of Lemma 1.3
A region in low state (yi = AL) incurs a deficit with the central bank at the end of t given
by NET (m)L = P (m)AL − 1 =
m(AL−AH)
mAH+(N−m)AL . At the rate rCB, the central bank stands
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ready to refinance the net deficit at a real cost rCBNET (m)L . The deficit region transfers
the corresponding amount of consumption goods to the central bank which forwards them
to surplus regions. The nominal market value of these real resource transfers is given by
P (m) · rCB ·NET (m)L . That is, if rCB < 1P (m) , then not all nominal deficits will be covered
through corresponding good flows at market rate. The difference is accounted for by
overdraft balances.
Proof of Proposition 1.3
The central bank achieves risk sharing through the common currency if
1 + 1
P (m)





and NET (m)H = P (m)AH − 1. This can be rearranged to obtain
rCB <
P (m)AH − 1




Further, this solution for rCB implies that
1 + 1
P (m)
+ rCBNET (m)L > 1 + AL (1.74)
Furthermore, since B(m) = m(1− P (m)rCB)NET (m), rCB < 1P (m) implies that B
(m) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.4
The central bank implements
1 + 1
P (m)




P (m) = N





N +mAH + (N −m)AL




(N −m)(AH − AL)
mAH + (N −m)AL
(1.78)
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L < AH−AL in any risk sharing allocation.
Using B(m) = m(1− P (m)r(m)CB )NET
(m)
H gives
B(m) = mN(N −m) [1 + AH − γ(1 + AL)](mAH + (N −m)AL)(N + (γ − 1)m)
(1.80)
which simplifies to the expression provided in the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 1.5









= m(m−N)N(mAH + (N −m)AL +N)
[(γ − 1)m+N ]2 (mAH + (N −m)AL)
< 0 (1.82)





= γ − 1
N((γ − 1)m+N)2(AH − AL)
·
[
(γ − 1)m2(AH − AL)2 + 2mN(AH − AL)2




For optimal balances B, we get
∂B
∂m
= (γ(1 + AL)− (1 + AH)) [AHγm
2 − AL(m− n)2]N2
[(γ − 1)m+N ]2 [mAH + (N −m)AL]2
(1.84)










> 0 if m < m̄, and ∂B
∂m
≤ 0 if m ≥ m̄.
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Proof of Proposition 1.6
Seigniorage is given by S(m) = B(m) Y (m)
N
where optimal balances B(m) are given by
B(m) = (N −m)Nm(AH − γAL)[(γ − 1)m+N ] [mAH + (N −m)AL]
(1.86)
and Y (m) = mAH + (N −m)AL. Using these two expressions yields the expression for S
provided in the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 1.7
The fiscal authority will transfer all tax revenue to regions with a low shock. The optimal
tax rate t then follows from the fiscal authority’s budget constraint:
t [N +mAH + (N −M)AL] = (N −m)
[
cSBL − (1− t)(1 + AL)
]
(1.87)
⇔ tm(1 + AH) = (N −m)(cSBL − (1 + AL)) (1.88)
where the expression for cSBL is taken from Proposition 1.1. This expression gives the
term for t provided in the Proposition. Further, it holds that S = B
P
= (N −m)(cSBL −
(1 + AL)).
Proof of Proposition 1.8
Follows immediately from the assumption of anonymous voting.
Proof of Proposition 1.9
Definition: A competitive equilibrium with complete markets and with aggregate risk is











L } where m = {0, 1, ..., N} denotes the number of regions
with a high productivity shock, c(m)H = (c
(0)











(a(1)SH , ..., a
(N−1)S




H , ..., a
(N−1)D
H ) such that
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H = AH − (N − 1)a
(m)S
H + (m− 1)a
(m)D
H ∀m ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} (1.90)
c
(m)
L = AL +ma
(m)D
H ∀m ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} (1.91)
AH + (m− 1)a(m)DH ≥ (N − 1)a
(m)S
H ∀m ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} (1.92)
(b) the allocation is feasible in every state of the world:
mc
(m)
H + (N −m)c
(m)
L = mAH + (N −m)AL ∀m ∈ {0, ..., N} (1.93)
(c) the asset market clears (each security is in zero net supply):
(N − 1)a(m)DH = (N − 1)a
(m)S
H ∀m ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} (1.94)




mAH + (N −m)AL
N




mAH + (N −m)AL
N








∀m ∈ {0, ..., N} (1.97)
i.e. regions issue N − 1 own Arrow securities at a quantity of AH−AL
N
per security and
buy N − 1 Arrow securities from other regions at a quantity of AH−AL
N
per security. Each
region holds a portfolio of securities from all other regions, thereby perfectly sharing risk.




Current Account and National Account Data is obtained from National Accounts of
OECD Countries, Volume I, Main Aggregates and National Accounts of OECD Countries,
Volume II, Detailed. Calculations are made for real per capita values. Population data as
54
1 THE COMMON CURRENCY CHANNEL OF RISK SHARING
well as CPI deflator data (2015=100) is obtained from the OECD. The TARGET balance
data is retrieved from the Institute of Empirical Economic Research - Osnabrück Uni-
versity (eurocrisismonitor.com). Finally, the import partner data comes from the World
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) software at the World Bank (wits.worldbank.org).
TARGET transfers for Core Countries






















Table 1.4: Implied TARGET Transfer for Core during Eurocrisis
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Additional Regression Results
Table 1.5 reports the results of the estimation for the subsample of Periphery countries
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain). For this subsample, TARGET transfers con-
tributed to around 80% of total consumption smoothing during the years 2008 and 2009.28
Finally, Table 1.6 shows the results of the estimation for the Core countries subsample.
It is apparent that for these countries, TARGET transfers did not play any meaningful
role in consumption smoothing. In general, it is noteworthy that for core countries only
15% of shocks to GDP are unsmoothed in 2008 and 2009 while 52% are unsmoothed for
Periphery countries during the same time period. Without the TARGET transfers, these
differences in consumption smoothing would have been even more pronounced. With-
out these transfers, 90% of shocks would have been unsmoothed in the Periphery while
only 23% would have been unsmoothed in the Core. This illustrates both the absence
of effective traditional risk sharing mechanisms in the Eurozone in general as well as the
quantitative importance of the common currency channel during the early stages of the
Eurocrisis.
28The results for the years 2008 and 2009 in the Periphery subsample are not significant due to the
small sample size. The coefficient on βTARGET is significant at the 15% level.
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2003-2007 2008-2009 2010-2014
Factor Income (βf ) 0.035 -0.034 0.032
(0.091) (0.123) (0.099)
Capital Depreciation (βd) 0.124*** 0.048 -0.063*
(0.027) (0.045) (0.033)
International Transfers (βt) -0.000 -0.031* -0.002
(0.026) (0.016) (0.023)
Savings (βs) 0.191 0.107 0.560***
(0.245) (0.339) (0.144)
TARGET (βTARGET ) 0.152 0.385 -0.326***
(0.179) (0.273) (0.109)
Not Smoothed (βu) 0.498*** 0.525*** 0.799***
(0.050) (0.086) (0.078)
Standard errors are in brackets. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Table 1.5: Risk Sharing Channels: Periphery Countries
Note: The table shows the results from performing the regressions in (1.40)-(1.45) for the subset of
Periphery countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) in the sample and for the three different
subperiods: before Eurocrisis (2003-2007), first stage of Eurocrisis (2008-2009), and second stage of
Eurocrisis (2010-2014). Coefficient interpretation is as before.
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2003-2007 2008-2009 2010-2014
Factor Income (βf ) 0.730 -0.696 -0.028
(0.530) (0.541) (0.171)
Capital Depreciation (βd) -0.032 -0.512*** -0.171**
(0.083) (0.190) (0.080)
International Transfers (βt) 0.220 0.868 -0.263**
(0.305) (0.155) (0.126)
Savings (βs) -0.126 1.108** 1.161**
(0.837) (0.512) (0.524)
TARGET (βTARGET ) 0.002 0.080 -0.000
(0.003) (0.062) (0.003)
Not Smoothed (βu) 0.206* 0.153*** 0.302
(0.124) (0.002) (0.188)
Standard errors are in brackets. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Table 1.6: Risk Sharing Channels: Core Countries
Note: The table shows the results from performing the regressions in (1.40)-(1.45) for the subset of Core
countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands) in the sample and
for the three different subperiods: before Eurocrisis (2003-2007), first stage of Eurocrisis (2008-2009),
and second stage of Eurocrisis (2010-2014). Coefficient interpretation is as before.
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2 Riding the Cycle
joint with Christoph Wolf
2.1 Introduction
Aggregate economic conditions, commonly referred to as the business cycle, matter for the
performance of individual investment projects. Projects which would do well in booms
may fail in recessions. Projects which would fail in recessions may do well in booms.
If financial market participants anticipate this dependence of project outcomes on the
state of the economy, financial market outcomes become a function of the business cycle.
However, the business cycle itself depends on financial market outcomes. In this paper,
we explore this interplay between financial market outcomes and the business cycle. We
study the question of optimal financial contracting when the business cycle is directly
influencing the success probability of investment projects. More specifically, we aim to
understand how overall credit availability and the type of financial contracts written be-
tween cash-constrained entrepreneurs and outside investors depend on the state of the
business cycle. We then explore how the outcome of financial contracting influences the
evolution of the business cycle which in turn impacts future financial contracting out-
comes.
When aggregate production is high, external finance becomes available at lower col-
lateral requirements. Azariadis et al. [2015] report a strong positive correlation between
unsecured credit and GDP in U.S. data between 1981 and 2012. They further document
that this correlation is stronger than the correlation between secured credit and GDP.
Asea and Blomberg [1998] find that bank lending standards systematically vary over the
business cycle. When aggregate output is high, banks reduce their lending standards
while they tighten the lending standard when aggregate output is low. Similarly, the
Senior Loan Office Survey conducted by the Federal Reserve indicates that commercial
banks in the U.S. countercylically adjust their lending standards when granting loans to
businesses. These empirical patterns indicate that the quantity as well as the type of
credit contracts change with the business cycle.
Our theoretical starting point is a model of financial contracting with moral hazard
similar to Holmström and Tirole [1998]. An entrepreneur requires outside finance from
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an investor to start working on an investment project. The success probability of this
project is a function of the entrepreneur’s unobserved effort. We extend the contracting
problem by assuming that aside from borrower effort, the observed state of the business
cycle influences project success probability. The entrepreneur and the investor take the
business cycle as exogenously given when contracting. Our key assumption is that effort
and cycle are substitutes in determining a project’s success probability. This implies that
the marginal effect of effort on a project’s success probability is higher when the business
cycle is low. We investigate how the state of the business cycle affects the entrepreneur’s
ability to raise external funds from the investor through a contract which induces the
entrepreneur to work. We call such a contract an incentive contract and find that the
business cycle has two conflicting effects on a borrower’s ability to raise external funds
through such a contract. The first effect, which we label profitability effect, reflects the
fact that a high business cycle increases the net present value of a project which is oper-
ated by an incentivized borrower. This effect facilitates a borrower’s access to incentive
contracts. The second effect results from the fact that a high business cycle makes the
borrower more inclined to shirk and ride the cycle for project success. In order to prevent
the borrower from shirking, the outside investor has to pay a rent. This agency effect of
the business cycle impedes the borrower’s access to finance through an incentive contract.
Agency costs are procyclical as a high business cycle requires the outside investor to pay
a higher rent to the borrower to prevent him from shirking. The overall effect of the
business cycle on the ability of a borrower to raise external funds through an incentive
contract depends on the relative strength of these two conflicting effects.
For a sufficiently high state of the business cycle, a second type of financial contracts
emerges: non-incentive contracts. Non-incentive contracts are contracts through which
the outside investor provides funds to entrepreneurs who cannot credibly commit to ex-
ert effort. The investor is well aware that the borrower will shirk and ride the cycle.
However, when the business cycle is sufficiently high such a contract will still finance a
positive NPV project. Non-incentive contracts give those borrowers access to funds who
would be credit-constrained otherwise. That is, the existence of non-incentive contracts
implies that overall credit availability is increasing in the business cycle. Entrepreneurs
prefer an incentive contract to a non-incentive contract. However, only entrepreneurs
with a sufficiently high asset endowment can credibly commit to exert effort and are able
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to obtain an incentive-contract. There is a threshold level of endowment below which an
entrepreneur will not be able to obtain an incentive contract. Whether this entrepreneur
obtains a non-incentive contract depends on whether the business cycle is above a thresh-
old level which makes this type of contracts profitable.
In a next step, we study a dynamic extension of our baseline model to endogenize the
business cycle. We assume that the cycle in t + 1 is a function of the realization of all
projects financed in t: The more projects are successful, the higher the cycle in the next
period. For simplicity, we assume that entrepreneurs live for one period only. They are
born with a random draw from an asset distribution, try to obtain finance from an out-
side investor, consume a fixed fraction of whatever return they have from investing into
the investment project, and die. That is, each generation of entrepreneurs is born into
a given asset distribution and leaves behind a new asset distribution from which a new
generation of entrepreneurs draw their initial endowments. We show that in the economy
without moral hazard, there exists a unique steady state business cycle and asset endow-
ment distribution to which the economy eventually converges. Uniqueness and existence
of this steady state follow from the assumption that the business cycle is increasing but
concave in the outcome of investment projects. That is, many successful projects in our
economy increase the future business cycle (and hence, the future success probability of
investment projects), but decreasingly so the higher the cycle. As entrepreneurs consume
a fixed fraction of their assets before disappearing, this implies that the economy will
converge to a steady state business cycle with a corresponding asset distribution.29
For the dynamic economy with agency frictions, we find that there is a tension between
more production and hence higher asset endowment due to higher states of the business
cycle on the one side, and increasing agency costs of the business cycle on the other
side. That is, the dynamic trade-off is one between an endowment effect and an agency
effect of the business cycle. For low states of the business cycle, the entrepreneurs’ asset
endowment grows faster than the agency rents. This gives more entrepreneurs access to
incentive contracts and increases the business cycle over time. There exists a threshold
level for the business cycle after which the agency rents increase faster in the business
cycle than the asset endowment and as a result, fewer entrepreneurs have access to in-
29These dynamics are similar to Solow [1957] where the existence and uniqueness of the steady state
rely on decreasing marginal product of capital and linear depreciation.
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centive contracts. We find that the dynamic economy has a unique steady state to which
the economy converges. If the endowment effect is sufficiently strong, then the economy
converges to this steady state monotonically. If, however, the agency effect is sufficiently
strong, then a higher business cycle can decrease the access to outside finance so much
that the business cycle decreases over time. This implies that it is possible that the
economy converges to its steady state with damped oscillations. A strong agency effect
implies that as the business cycle increases, fewer agents will have access to incentive
contracts. If this effect outweighs the endowment effect, production in the economy goes
down as the business cycle increases further. In the following period, a lower business
cycle implies lower agency frictions and hence, more agents will be able to obtain in-
centive contracts again which outweighs the direct negative effect of a lower business
cycle on production through lower success probabilities. The economy then grows again,
shrinks in the following period and so on until the economy eventually converges to a
stable steady state. That is, we find that in the dynamic economy with distortions, the
economy may fluctuate between times when the agency effect dominates the endowment
effect (and the business cycle worsens), and times where the endowment effect dominates
the agency effect (and the business cycle improves).
Procyclical agency costs and the existence of non-incentive contracts create a feedback
between aggregate output and the equilibrium mix of credit contracts which may help
explain the observed cyclical patterns of unsecured credit and lending standards in U.S.
data. More specifically, our theory implies that the amount of uncollateralized debt is
increasing in the business cycle as borrowers free ride on the cycle within non-incentive
contracts. Further, non-incentive contracts increase borrower leverage as even borrowers
with low asset endowments will be able to obtain credit. This is in line with the observed
empirical pattern of lenders loosening their lending standard leading to higher borrower
leverage. We conclude that, while a more serious empirical assessment is necessary (work
in progress), our theory seems promising in explaining stylized facts about financial con-
tracting and aggregate output.
Related Literature. Our work is related to the large literature on business cycle
dynamics with financial frictions. Famously, Bernanke et al. [1999] (henceforth BGG
1999) provide a financial accelerator model in which agency frictions amplify business
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cycle shocks. In their model, a borrower’s net worth determines the ’external finance pre-
mium’ which is the premium an outside investor has to be paid to be compensated for the
agency cost. When a borrower’s net worth is low, then this premium is high and equilib-
rium lending is decreased. If borrower’s net worth is procyclical, then financial frictions
propagate and amplify shocks to net worth. While BGG (1999) impose a costly state
verification setup as in Townsend [1979] to motivate asymmetric information between
an entrepreneur and an outside investor, our paper focuses on a moral hazard problem
similar to Holmström and Tirole [1998] [2011]. Despite this difference, our paper shares
many features of the BGG framework. The asset distribution in our model is equivalent
to borrower’s net worth in their model, and in both models agency frictions are mitigated
if the borrower has more assets/endowments to pledge to an outside investor. However,
a major difference to BGG is that in our model the business cycle does not have an
unambigously positive effect on the ease with which a borrower can raise external funds.
In BGG agency costs are strictly counteryclical as an improving business cycle increases
borrower’s net worth and thereby decreases the agency friction unambiguously. In our
model, on the other hand, a higher business cycle induces the borrower to shirk and
ride the cycle, which he can only be prevented from with a higher rent (agency effect).
This renders agency costs procyclical in our model. A higher business cycle in our model
might still increase the credit availability in the economy because projects get a higher
net present value (profitability effect), but this channel is a distinctly different channel
from the one in BGG.
Azariadis et al. [2015] document the above mentioned cyclical patterns of unsecured
credit and aggregate production. They explain these patterns using a model in which
unsecured firm credit arises from self-enforcing borrowing constraints. More specifically,
unsecured credit in their model arises as borrowers care about their credit reputation.
In our setup, unsecured credit arises as lenders allow borrowers to free ride on the (suf-
ficiently high) business cycle. Leverage dynamics over the business cycle have further
been studied by Halling et al. [2016], Adrian and Shin [2010], and Erel et al. [2011].
We contribute to this line of research by establishing the procylicality of leverage as a
result of procyclical agency costs. That is, higher aggregate output makes it harder for
entrepreneurs to credibly commit to high effort. As a result, more entrepreneurs end up
with non-incentive contracts which implies higher economy-wide leverage. Kiyotaki and
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Moore [1997] study the interplay between the business cycle and asset prices. They show
how a deterioration of asset prices during economic downturns further exacerbates the
downturn. While our dynamic model does not explicitly feature asset prices, the business
cycle impacts the economy’s total asset endowment and thereby influences financial con-
tracting. This implies an exacerbation of economic downturns through shrinking asset
endowments. Myerson [2012] proposes a model of moral hazard driven credit cycles in
which the moral hazard problem arises on the side of the financial intermediary. In his
model, credit cycles arise as banker agency rents can be spread out through a banker’s
career. In our model, agency rents are static, and credit cycles arise from the dynamic
interaction of credit contracts and aggregate output. Reichlin and Siconolfi [2004] study
the joint effects of moral hazard and adverse selection for financial contracting. They
find that endogenous cycles may arise due to a switch of equilibrium financial contract-
ing. More specifically, the equilibrium in their model is described by ’pooling’ contracts
in which all borrowers obtain the same contract irrespective of their project selection,
or ’separating’ contracts in which borrowers self-select into contracts designed for their
respective project choice. While our model only considers moral hazard in financial con-
tracting, we similarly find distinct types of contracts in the model economy: incentive
and non-incentive contracts. The dynamics of our economy are driven by the endogenous
fluctuations of the fraction of entrepreneurs sorted into either of these two contracts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents our model economy
which we use to study the impact of the business cycle on financial contracting with
moral hazard. We first solve the model for optimal financial contracts. In section 2.3,
we endogenize the business cycle and study the dynamics resulting from the interplay
between the business cycle and financial contracting. In section 2.4, we discuss the
implications of our theoretical analysis for the observed cyclical patterns of secured and
unsecured credit in U.S. data. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Static Model: Exogenous Business Cycle
In each period t, there is a unit mass of agents with initial wealth, Ai, distributed uni-
formly on [0, At]. Each agent is born with an idea that generates a payoff of y if it is
successful but costs I to be carried out. Agents are cash-constrained such that At < I
and are protected by limited liability. They seek outside funding for the remaining I−Ai
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units of capital from a principal. The probability of success, f(ai, bt), depends on the
agent’s effort, ai ∈ {aL, aH}, and the business cycle in period t, bt ∈ [b, b]. Exerting high
effort, aH , comes at a cost of k. Agents make take-it-or-leave it offers to the principals
whose outside option is 0. We can then distinguish between two types of contracts: in-
centive contracts as well as non-incentive contracts. In incentive contracts, the agent will
exert high effort while he will shirk in non-incentive contracts. Both can arise due to
the heterogeneity of Ai following the logic in Holmström and Tirole [2011]: the agent’s
incentive constraint as well as the principal’s participation constraint have to be satisfied
at the same time for incentive contracts to be feasible. This will only be feasible for
agent’s with an initial endowment Ai > Â as derived below.
The timing in our economy within any given period t is as follows:
1. Agents are endowed with endowment Ai ∼ U [0, At] (wealth in t is Wt = At2 ).
2. The business cycle bt is observed and contracts are signed.
3. The projects’ outcomes realize according to f(ai, bt).
Assumptions on success probabilities. We make the following assumptions throughout
the analysis:
(i) f(aH , b)y − k > f(aL, b)y ∀b: The net present value (NPV) of a project is always
higher when the agent works.
(ii) ∂f(ai,b)
∂b
> 0 and ∂
2f(ai,b)
∂b2
< 0 ∀b: Success probabilities are increasing and concave in
the business cycle.
(iii) ∆f(b) ≡ f(aH , b) − f(aL, b) > 0, ∆bf(b) < 0 and ∆bbf(b) > 0 ∀b: Success
probabilities are always higher when the agent works, and the difference between
working and shirking is decreasing and convex in the business cycle.
(iv) f(aH , b)y − I − k > 0 > f(aL, b)y: At the lowest level of the business cycle, only
exerting effort generates an NPV positive project.
(v) ∃ b̃ : f(aL, b̃)y = I: There exists a level of the business cycle such that shirking on
a project becomes NPV positive.
(vi) At < I ∀t: No agent will ever be self-financed.
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Assumption (i) and Assumption (ii) are natural assumptions. Assumption (iii) requires
some explanation. It states that the business cycle increases the probability of success
more when the agent shirks compared to when he works. Suppose that shirking when
the business cycle is low almost certainly leads to failure, while when the business cycle
is very favorable even shirking might lead to a nearly certain good outcome. Then the
difference in success probabilities from working compared to shirking (∆f(b)) is very high
when the cycle is low, and very low when the cycle is high. For the success probability
of shirking to catch up with the success probability of working over the business cycle a
relatively larger increase in success probability for shirking over the cycle is needed, i.e.
∆bf(b) > 0. By assuming convexity of ∆f(b), we basically assume that this catching
up happens mostly at lower levels of the business cycle and fades out at higher levels.
Assumption (iv) and (v) ensure that there will always be incentive contracts available in
the economy, while non-incentive contracts only become profitable after the business cycle
has passed a threshold b̃. Assumption (vi) ensures that all agents in the economy need
some external finance. While we could allow agents to become self-financed eventually, it
would water down the dynamics of our main mechanism without qualitatively affecting
the analysis.
2.2.1 Analysis: Static Equilibrium Financial Contracting
We begin our analysis by determining the distribution of contracts given a particular
business cycle state, b, and wealth implied by A. Holmström and Tirole [2011] show
that the initial wealth of an agent determines whether he is able to receive an incentive
contract. Therefore, there will be a cutoff value of initial wealth, Â(b), such that all agents
with Ai ≥ Â(b) will obtain an incentive contract while all other agents with Ai < Â(b)
will either receive no contract or a non-incentive contract.
The cutoff Â is determined by the compatibility of the relevant constraints at the con-
tracting stage which are the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint and the principal’s
participation constraint. These are given by
f(aH , b)xi − k ≥ f(aL, b)xi (incentive-compatibility)
f(aH , b)(y − xi) ≥ I − Ai. (participation)
Given that the agent makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the principal, the principal’s
66
2 RIDING THE CYCLE
participation constraint will be binding and it follows that xi = y − I−Aif(aH ,b) . However,
this is only a feasible incentive contract if this xi induces the agent to exert effort, i.e., if
xi ≥ k∆f(b) which implies the following condition





In the words of Holmström and Tirole [2011], the agent’s pledgeable income is less than the
net present value of the project due to the agency cost. As a result, the asset endowment
of agents has to be sufficiently high for an agent to receive an incentive contract.
The contribution of our work is to connect the success probabilities of projects with
the business cycle state b. We summarize the contracting stage as well as the distribution
of contracts in the following lemma.
Proposition 2.1 (Incentive and Non-Incentive Contracts.).
All agents with Ai ≥ Â(b) will receive an incentive contract and exert effort. Hence,
the aggregate amount of effort in the economy is 1 − Â(b)
At
. If the business cycle is suf-
ficiently high, b ≥ b̃, all remaining agents will receive non-incentive contracts, where





. If the business cycle is low, b < b̃, agents with Ai < Â(b) receive no
contracts.
With this result at hand, we aim to understand how the distribution of contracts and
the distribution of effort changes with the business cycle. First, consider the effects on
incentive contracts. Given our assumptions that, independently of effort, the probability
of a project succeeding is increasing in the business cycle (fb(·, b) > 0) and that successes
are less informative about effort in high business cycle states (∆bf(b) < 0), the business
cycle has two effects in the contracting stage: (i) profitability effect: the probability of a
success becomes higher and, hence, the profitability of projects increases, and, (ii) agency
effect: because the informativeness of a success about effort decreases, the agent is more
inclined to shirk when the business cycle is high, because b and a are substitutes, and
a higher rent is necessary to induce the agent to exert effort. The two effects go in
opposite directions and Â may be either increasing or decreasing in effort. Second, when
the business cycle increases it may surpass the threshold level b̃ such that non-incentive
contracts also become feasible and the total amount of projects discontinuously jumps
up.
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Corollary 2.1. The share of non-incentive contracts may increase with the business cycle
for two reasons:
1. b increases above the threshold b̃ such that non-incentive contracts will become prof-
itable and will be signed,
2. b is above b̃ and increases the cutoff level Â(b).
The cutoff level Â(b) can be either increasing or decreasing in the business cycle depending
on the relative strengths of the profitability and the agency effect. Â(b) is convex if ∆f(b)
is not too convex.
To understand the last part of Corollary 2.1, consider the derivative of Â(b) with respect
to the business cycle
∂Â
∂b





profitability effect: < 0
− ∆bf(b)∆f(b) f(aH , b)
k
∆f(b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
agency effect: ≶ 0
(2.2)
That is, the profitability effect increases the net present value of projects and thus de-
creases the threshold value of asset endowment Â. For the agency effect, the sign is
ambiguous whenever ∆bf(b) < 0, i.e., when effort and cycle are substitutes. Then the
agent becomes harder to incentivize, and profitability and agency effect go in opposite
directions.30 To see the convexity of Â when ∆bf(b) < M with M > 0, consider the














2) + f(ah, b)∆bbf(b)
)
The only term that can be negative is the very last one including ∆bbf(b). Hence, if the
difference ∆f(b) is not too convex, Â(b) is convex which implies that the agency effect
becomes relatively more important the higher the business cycle.
30If effort and cycle are complements, then ∆bf(b) > 0 and it becomes cheaper to incentivize agents
when the cycle goes up. This implies that ∂Â∂b < 0. We abstract from this case as it is of less theoretical
interest.
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Figure 2.1: Contracts among agents as a function of the business cycle
Note: Illustration for parameterization of aH = 3, aL = 2, k = 0.02, y = 1.1, I = 1. The required level
of asset endowment Â is increasing in the business cycle as the agency effect dominates the profitability
effect. For b > b̄, non-incentive contracts become feasible for agents which asset endowments below Â.
2.2.2 Numerical Illustration: Incentive and Non-Incentive Contracts
Consider f(a, b) = 1− e−(a+b). In this specification, effort and business cycle are substi-
tutes and the cutoff Â is given by
Â(b) = I − (1− e−(aH+b))
(
y − k
e−b(e−aL − e−aH )
)
and its derivative with respect to the business cycle by
dÂ(b)
db
= −e−(aH+b)y + ke
aH+aL
e−b(eaH − eaL)
It is easy to see that in this case Â(b) is convex and that dÂ(b)
db
> 0 for b sufficiently large.
Non-incentive contracts become profitable whenever f(aL, b)y ≥ I which implies in this
case that






− aL ≤ b.
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of contracts graphically. The black line represents Â(b)
and all agents with Ai ≥ Â(b) receive incentive contracts. The agents with Ai < Â(b)
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receive non-incentive contracts only if b ≥ b̃. This example is constructed such that the
agency effect of a higher business cycle always dominates the profitability effect, even
at low levels of b. That is, Â(b) is monotonically increasing in b. As the business cycle
increases, the agents’ pledgeable income decreases and hence, fewer agents will be able
to obtain incentive contracts. However, if the cycle exceeds the threshold level b̃, non-
incentive contracts become profitable and allow agents without incentive contracts to
obtain outside funds.
2.3 Dynamic Model: Endogenous Business Cycles
In this subsection, we show how the economy evolves when the business cycle is endoge-
nously determined by the performance of contracts in the previous period. We assume
that bt = b(At) with b(·) increasing and weakly concave. Hence, higher output in the
last period translates into a higher business cycle period in the present period. Given a
distribution of contracts we can derive the law of motion of wealth in the economy. For
simplicity, we just consider At instead of Wt which is directly given by Wt = 2At. The
transition between periods is then given by:
• Project outcomes are realized and new wealth is given by the profits Wt.2.
• Agents consume an exogenously given fraction c of wealth and disappear thereafter.
• (1 − c)Wt.2 = Wt+1 is the new wealth and Ai in t + 1 is distributed according to
U [0, At+1] with At+1 = 2Wt+1.
• The new business cycle is bt+1 = b(At+1) where b is an increasing weakly concave
function.
2.3.1 First Best Dynamics
In a frictionless economy, there is no agency conflict and each agent exerts effort. The
law of motion for the asset distribution in such an economy is given by
At+1 = (1− c) [f(aH , b(At))y − I − k] (2.3)
The steady state of this economy is reached at At+1 = At ≡ AFB. It is straightforward to
see that At+1 is increasing and concave given our assumptions on f . Figure 2.2 illustrates
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Figure 2.2: First Best Steady State
the Solow-type dynamics. There is a unique stable steady state at AFB > 0. There is
no trivial steady state at At+1 = At = 0 since AFBt+1(At = 0) > 0 which follows from our
assumption that exerting effort always is NPV positive, even at the lowest possible state
of the business cycle.
2.3.2 Dynamics in Economy with Distortions
In the economy with agency frictions, there will be agents which cannot credibly commit
to exert effort, and these agents will not obtain an incentive contract. Let λt denote the




, 0}, 1} ∈ [0, 1] (2.4)
where Ât is the threshold value of asset endowment derived in Proposition 2.1.
Lemma 2.1. Assume that Â is increasing and convex in the economy’s asset endowment
At. Further assume that there exists an At such that Ât < At. Then, ∃ A0 > 0, A1 >
A0 > 0 such that Â0 = A0 and A1 = Â1. It holds that λt = 0 ∀At 6∈ [A0, A1]. Further,
∃ Ā ∈ (A0, 1) such that λ′ > 0 if At < Â and λ′ ≤ 0 if At ≥ Â. Moreover, λ′′ ≤ 0 ∀At.
Corollary 2.1 established that the threshold Â is increasing and convex in A if the agency
effect dominates the profitability effect for all At, and that if ∆f(b) is not too convex, we
get that ∂Â
∂A
> 0 for all At. Lemma 2.1 shows that under these assumptions, the fraction
of agents with access to incentive contracts is non-monotonic in asset endowment At. For
low values of At, an increase in the asset endowment leads to an increase in the fraction
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λt ≡ 1− Ât/At
ĀA0 A1
Figure 2.3: Evolution of λt (fraction of agents with incentive contracts)
Note: For low levels of economy-wide asset endowment At, no agent has access to incentive contracts
due to individual asset endowments being too low compared to agency costs. The fraction of agents with
incentive contracts λt is increasing after a threshold level A0 is passed as the increase in asset endowment
outweighs the increasing agency costs. Due to the convexity of agency costs, the increase in these costs
eventually outweigh the increase in asset endowment (between Ā and A1). Once the economy-wide asset
endowment reaches A1, agency costs are so high that no agent has access to incentive contracts.
of agents with access to incentive contracts. This increase is due to the fact that, even
though the agency costs are increasing as At increases, more agents pass the threshold
level Â of asset endowment. We call this the endowment effect. For sufficiently high
values of At, however, further increases in At lead to a decrease in the fraction of agents
with access to incentive contracts. This is the case as agency costs are convex in At and,
eventually, outweigh the endowment effect of higher values of At. Figure 2.3 illustrates
with a stylized example. As the figure shows, there exists a threshold level A0 below which
no agent will be able to obtain an incentive contract. Similarly, there is a threshold level
A1 above which agency costs are so high that no agent will obtain an incentive contract.
Furthermore, the (weak) convexity of Â implies that λt is (weakly) concave in At.
For the rest of this subsection, assume that non-incentive contracts are feasible even
at the lowest level of the business cycle (i.e. b̃ = b(0)). This implies that agents without
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access to incentive contracts will always be able to obtain non-incentive contracts. In the
economy with distortions, the law of motion for asset endowment is then given by
h(At) = (1− c)
λ(At) [f(aH , b(At))y − I − k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡m(At)
+(1− λ(At)) [f(aL, b(At))y − I]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡g(At)
 (2.5)
where m(At) denotes the asset accumulation through incentive contracts, and g(At) de-
notes the asset accumulation through non-incentive contracts. Given our assumptions on
success probabilities, it holds that m > g and m′ < g′. That is, the law of motion for
the distorted economy is a convex combination of the law of motion of the economy only
with incentive contracts (m(At)) and the law of motion for the economy with only non-
incentive contracts (g(At)) where the weighing factor is given by the fraction of agents
with access to incentive contracts (λ(At)). The economy with only incentive contracts
has a unique stable steady state (as shown in Figure 2.2). Since h(At) is a convex com-
bination of m(At) and g(At), it is bounded below by g(At) and bounded above by m(At)
for all At. This implies that the distorted economy has a unique steady state.
Proposition 2.2 (Existence and Uniqueness of Steady State.).
There is exactly one steady state in the distorted economy. This steady state is globally
stable.
The unique steady state is stable in the sense that independent of the initial asset endow-
ment At, the economy converges to its steady state. That is, the steady state is a sink.
However, as the next Proposition shows, the type of convergence towards the steady state
depends on the severity of the agency friction.
Proposition 2.3 (Convergence to Steady State.).
The distorted economy converges to its unique steady state A∗ with damped oscillations
if, in steady state, a sufficiently high fraction of agents is without access to incentive
contracts: ∃ x ∈ (0, 1) s.t. h′(A∗) < 0 if Â(A
∗)
A∗
∈ (x, 1). Otherwise, the economy converges
to its steady state monotonically.
Convergence in damped oscillations requires the law of motion for the distorted economy,
h(At), to be negatively sloped at the steady state. Proposition 2.3 shows that this is
possible if, in steady state, sufficiently many entrepreneurs are without access to incentive
contracts - that is, if agency costs are sufficiently high. Intuitively, as At passes the
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Figure 2.4: Steady State of the Distorted Economy
Note: m(At) denotes the law of motion with only incentive contracts, and g(At) denotes the law of
motion only with only non-incentive contracts. The law of motion for the distorted economy is a convex
combination between these two law of motions where λt ∈ [0, 1] measures the weight on the law of motion
with only incentive contracts. hOSC(At) denotes the law of motion for an economy in which Ā is reached
quickly so that the law of motion is downward sloping above the 45◦-degree line.
threshold Ā, the growth process of the distorted economy may be non-monotonic: An
increase of At above Ā increases the number of agents without incentive contracts as
agency costs become sufficiently strong. This reduces production in that period. At
the same time, output in the economy increases for every given contract as the success
probability increases. These two effects go in opposite direction. Proposition 2.3 shows
that if, in steady state, the fraction of agents without access to incentive contracts is
sufficiently large, then the first effect dominates the former, and more asset endowment
leads to less production. Less production leads to less asset endowment in the next
period which in turn reduces the agency costs in that period. This alleviation of agency
frictions allows more agents to obtain incentive contracts in the next period, thereby
increasing production next period. This, in turn, increases the agency costs in the period
after, thereby increasing the amount of agents without incentive contracts leading to a
decrease in output, and so on. The economy fluctuates between periods of production
growth and production decline until steady state is reached. If, however, the fraction
of credit constrained entrepreneurs is sufficiently low in steady state, then the second
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effect dominates the first, and the economy monotonically converges to its steady state.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the two types of convergence.
The figure demonstrates the two steady states obtained in the hypothetical economy
with only non-incentive contracts (A∗NIC) and the economy with only incentive contracts
(A∗IC). The distorted economy lies in between these two benchmarks as a convex com-
bination of the respective laws of motion. If Â is growing fast enough in At, then the
threshold level Ā is reached quickly. This allows for the possibility that the law of motion
of asset endowment in the distorted economy is downward-sloping around the steady
state (hOSC(At)). If, on the other hand, the fraction of credit-constrained entrepreneurs
is sufficiently low around steady state, then the distorted economy will converge mono-
tonically to its unique steady state (hMON(At)). We conclude that a sufficiently severe
agency friction in the contracting stage can lead the dynamic economy to exhibit cycles
of production growth and decline around its steady state.
2.3.3 Numerical Illustration: Damped Oscillations Around Steady State
Consider an economy in which b(At) = αAγt with α = 2 and γ = 0.5. Figure 2.5 shows
both the asset endowment threshold Â(At) above which entrepreneurs obtain incentive
contracts as well as the corresponding fraction of entrepreneurs with access to incentive
contracts, λ(At), for this economy.
As the asset endowment At increases, the threshold Â grows due to larger agency
costs as a result of an improving business cycle. For Â > 0, some entrepreneurs will not
have enough asset endowment to credibly commit to exerting effort, i.e. their pledgeable
income is not high enough to obtain an incentive contract. These entrepreneurs will
be excluded from incentive contracts (decreasing λ) and obtain non-incentive contracts
instead. For a sufficiently high level of the business cycle, agency costs become so large
that no entrepreneur will have access to incentive contracts (λ = 0), and all entrepreneurs
obtain non-incentive contracts if they are feasible (which is the case for A > 0.03). Then,
every entrepreneur is ’riding the cycle’. Figure 2.6 shows the laws of motion for this
economy.
The red line indicates the law of motion for the undistorted economy in which each
entrepreneur always obtains an incentive contract. The yellow line, on the other hand,
shows the law of motion for the economy in which only non-incentive contracts are avail-
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Figure 2.5: Asset threshold Â and entrepreneurs with access to incentive contracts λ
Note: Numerical illustration of threshold asset endowment Ât and fraction of agents with incentive
contracts λt. Functional form is b(At) = αAγt with α = 2 and γ = 0.5.
able.31 The purple line represents the law of motion of the distorted economy which is
in between these two extreme cases. We see that for A < 0.0.065, the distorted econ-
omy follows the law of motion of the undistorted economy. That is, the agency costs
are sufficiently low such that each entrepreneur has access to incentive contracts. For
A > 0.0.65, agency costs are sufficiently high such that some entrepreneurs are excluded
from incentive contracts and obtain non-incentive contracts instead. As a result, the
law of motion for the distorted economy divorces from the law of motion of the undis-
torted economy as it becomes a strictly convex combination of the two benchmark law
of motions. For A > 0.1334, agency costs are so large that no entrepreneur has access to
incentive contracts, and the law of motion follows the law of motion of the economy with
only non-incentive contracts.
The slope of the law of motion for the distorted economy is negative around steady
state which implies that the economy converges to steady state with damped oscillations.
Assume that the economy is in steady state at time t. Consider an exogenous shock to the
business cycle such that the probabilities of success in period t are altered to f(a, b− ε)
where ε > 0. This leads to a decrease in output produced in period t and hence, an asset
31Note that in this example, the economy with only non-incentive contracts has no steady state.
Further, non-incentive contracts are not feasible at A = 0.
76
2 RIDING THE CYCLE
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2












Figure 2.6: Laws of Motion
Note: The law of motion for the distorted economy, h(A), intersects 45◦-degree line with a negative slope.
endowment in t + 1 which is lower than its steady state level. The economy will then
converge back to its steady state with damped oscillations. Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8
show the evolution of asset endowment and the fraction of incentive contracts in response
to a one-time (negative) shock to the business cycle, respectively. The shock is assumed
to reduce the business cycle by 5% at t = 3.
As Figure 2.7 shows, the convergence of asset endowment back to stead state occurs
in damped oscillations. The negative business cycle shock reduces production at t =
3 which reduces the asset endowment in the economy. As Figure 2.8 indicates, this
reduces the agency friction in the next period implying that more entrepreneurs obtain
access to incentive contracts. In the following period, this increase in incentive contracts
leads to large production increases which boosts asset endowment above its steady state
level. This increases agency costs and leads to a decrease in entrepreneurs with access
to incentive contracts. This decrease reduces production next period which leads to a
decline in the business cycle and hence reduces agency costs, and so on.
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Figure 2.7: Impulse Response - Asset Endowment
Note: The level of the business cycle (as measured by At) is reduced by 5% at t = 3. The asset endowment
increases in t = 4 due to the alleviation of the agency friction. In t = 5, the asset endowment shrinks as
the the agency frictions increased, and so on. The economy eventually converges back to steady state.










Figure 2.8: Impulse Response - Fraction of Entrepreneurs with Access to Incentive Con-
tracts
Note: As the business cycle (measured by At) decreases in t = 3, agency frictions are reduced for the
next period. As a result, more agents have access to incentive contracts (increase in λt. This increases
production and asset endowment in the next period. Hence, the agency frictions increase in t = 5,
reducing the access to incentive contracts, and so on.
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2.4 Empirical Evaluation: Procyclical Agency Costs in the Data
Procyclical agency costs are at the heart of our theory. As aggregate conditions improve,
entrepreneurs are more inclined to free ride on the business cycle which makes it harder
for them to obtain outside funds. As we showed in the previous section, if this agency
friction is sufficiently strong, it may be the case that as the business cycle improves,
fewer agents will be able to credibly commit to exerting effort. As a result, more non-
incentive contracts will be written at the expense of fewer incentive contracts. We derive
the following two key predictions from our analysis:
1. Collateralization of credit is decreasing over the business cycle.
2. Leverage is increasing over the business cycle.
The first prediction rests on the observation that in the model, incentive contracts are
’collateralized’ by the entrepreneur’s asset endowment while non-incentive contracts im-
ply that a subset of credit contracts written in our model economy is uncollateralized.
Similarly, non-incentive contracts allow entrepreneurs with very little asset endowment
to obtain the required funds to invest into the investment project. This increases leverage
(debt-equity ratio) in the economy. We use these two model predictions to address the
empirical relevance of our theory. In this section, we offer some preliminary empirical
evidence for these two main hypotheses.32
Figure 2.9 (taken from Azariadis et al. [2015]) shows the evolution of secured and
unsecured debt in U.S. data from 1981 to 2012 as well as corresponding business cycle
data (recessions in grey).33 Azariadis et al. [2015] report that the correlation between
unsecured credit and GDP is given by 0.7. This is in line with our theoretical prediction
that as the business cycle improves, more non-incentive contracts are being written. The
authors also find that secured credit is weakly negatively correlated (-0.15) with con-
temporaneous GDP. Within our model, this observation is explained through procyclical
agency costs which reduce the access to incentive contracts. As a result, improving ag-
32A more detailed empirical assessment is work in progress.
33The figure shows unsecured and secured debt for Compustat firms, and GDP multiplied by factor
four (annual linearly detrended series, 1981–2012). Secured debt is obtained from the Compustat item
“dm: debt mortgages and other secured debt” while unsecured debt is the residual from total debt to
secured debt. See Azariadis et al. [2015] for a detailed description of the data.
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Figure 2.9: Secured and Unsecured Debt in U.S. (reproduced from Azariadis et al. [2015])
Note: Unsecured and secured debt for Compustat firms. GDP multiplied by factor four (annual linearly
detrended series, from 1981 to 2012).
gregate conditions imply a shift from incentive to non-incentive contract. We interpret
the data on secured and unsecured as roughly in line with this notion.
Non-incentive contracts allow the entrepreneur in our model to increase his leverage.
More specifically, assume that I = 1 and that the entrepreneur has an asset endowment
of A < 1. If the entrepreneur borrows 1−A to invest into the production technology, then
the margin or haircut is given by A/I=A%. The leverage is the reciprocal of the margin,
i.e. I/A = 1/A > 1 (see Geanakoplos [2010]). That is, our model predicts that the
existence of non-incentive contracts implies increasing leverage over the business cycle.
Figure 2.10 shows data from the Senior Loan Officer Survey, conducted by the Federal
Reserve Board.
Similar to Zhang [2019], we interpret the lending standards applied by banks when
granting loans as a proxy for haircuts applied.34 Figure 2.10 indicates that before and
during recessions, banks increase their lending standards (or increase haircuts) which is
equivalent to an increase in the asset endowment threshold Â in our model. If the business
cycle suddenly worsens, then non-incentive contracts may no longer be profitable. As a
34Geanakoplos [2010] and Gorton and Metrick [2012] provide similar evidence from repo markets.
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Figure 2.10: Senior Loan Office Survey
Note: Net Percentage of Domestic Banks Tightening Standards for Commercial and Industrial Loans to
Large and Middle-Market Firms.
result, these contracts will not be written and the business cycle will indeed worsen.
This implies the negative correlation between haircuts and the business cycle indicated
in the figure. Similarly, when the business cycle is improving, collateral requirements
are reduced (lower haircuts) as non-incentive contracts become available. Our theoretical
analysis implies that as the business cycle improves, agency costs rise and may eventually
lead to a decrease in the business cycle. If this is the case, the economy may fluctuate
between increasing and decreasing lending standards as in Figure 2.8. Assuming the
economy is out of steady state, this results in endogenous ups and downs of lending
standards. We conclude that our theory is in line with the observed correlation between
lending standards and aggregate output.
2.5 Conclusion
We study the interplay between the business cycle and financial contracting. The key
assumption we make is that both borrower effort as well as the state of the business cycle
determine the probability of success of investment projects. This implies that borrowers
are inclined to free ride on the business cycle. As a result, agency costs are procyclical
which acts to decrease entrepreneurial access to credit contracts as the business cycle
improves. At the same time, however, a higher business cycle improves the overall prof-
itability of investment projects which facilitates entrepreneurial access to outside funds.
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The overall impact of the state of the business cycle on entrepreneurial access to funds
then depends on the relative strengths of the agency effect and the profitability effect.
We further find that if the business cycle is sufficiently high, a second type of financial
contract arises: non-incentive contracts. These contracts allow entrepreneurs without
access to incentive contracts to obtain external finance. Within non-incentive contracts,
borrowers free ride on the cycle while still maintaining a positive net present value of
investment.
In a dynamic extension of our model, we find that as the business cycle increases, suf-
ficiently high agency costs may imply a shift from incentive to non-incentive contracts.
Thus, as the business cycle improves, more and more entrepreneurs free-ride on it. We
find that the dynamic economy has a unique steady state. Convergence to this steady
state may occur in damped oscillations, implying alternating ups and downs in aggregate
production as a result to a one-time negative GDP shock. We conclude by relating our
theoretical predictions to the observed cyclical patterns of secured and unsecured credit
in the U.S. between 1981 and 2012. We interpret the strong procylicality of unsecured
credit as a result of procyclical agency costs which imply a shift towards non-incentive
contracts during times of high aggregate production.
The notion that the state of the business cycle is directly influencing the success prob-
ability of investment projects can be conceptualized in different ways. In this paper, we
have studied a financial contracting model with moral hazard which results in procyclical
agency costs. A different way of incorporating the business cycle into financial contracting
is to assume that borrower type is hidden information, and that lenders learn about bor-
rower type through performance. In such a setup, the business cycle interferes with the
lender’s learning from the borrower’s performance. That is, poor borrower performance
may be a result of bad borrower (or project) type or a poor business cycle realization. In
such a model, the state of the business cycle influences the lender’s willingness to termi-
nate a credit relationship. More specifically, poor performance when the business cycle
is high implies that the lender gets a bad signal about borrower quality which induces
him to terminate the relationship. At the same time, however, if the business cycle has
some persistence, the lender may expect the future business cycle to be high as well.
This reduces the incentive to terminate the credit relationship. Studying the tension
between these two effects gives a new understanding of banks’ reactions to loan covenant
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violations (see Chodorow-Reich and Falato [2017] for a discussion of the importance of
loan covenant violations during the financial crisis starting in 2008). Similarly, in such
a setup, a high current or future business cycle is a substitute for information generated
from screening and thus, reduces the lender’s incentive to generate information about the
borrower. This gives a new perspective on bank screening cycles.
2.6 Appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 2.2
It holds that
h′(At) = λ′(At)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≶0












h′′(At) = λ′′(At)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0




[m′(At)− g′(At)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0









This implies that, if At < Ā, then h′ > 0 and h′′ < 0, i.e. h(At) is concave in At for
At < Ā. Hence, if Ā ≥ ANIC , there is a unique steady state.
Consider Ā < ANIC . Then h may be increasing or decreasing, concave or convex.
However, we know that h′ ≤ g′ for At > Ā and thus, there is at most one intersection of
h with the 45◦-line.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2.3
At the steady state A∗, the slope of h is given by
h′(A∗) = λ′(A∗) [m(A∗)− g(A∗)] + λ(A∗)m′(A∗) + (1− λ(A∗))g′(A∗) (2.8)
If A∗ ≤ Ā, then λ′(A∗) ≥ 0 and the slope is positive, implying monotone convergence to
steady state.
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A∗m′(A∗) + Â′(A∗)(m(A∗)− g(A∗))
m(A∗)− g(A∗) + A∗(m′(A∗) + g′(A∗)) (2.10)















joint with Saumya Deojain
3.1 Introduction
The record-breaking volume of migration in the past few years has made the question of
how to deal with conflict created by diverse communities a pressing issue for governments
all over the world. Elements of this conflict are often embodied in discomfort with dif-
ferentiated cultural consumption. A Christian may dislike the type of consumption that
is specific to Ramadan and a Muslim may dislike the expression of religiosity celebrated
during Lent. By framing conflict between divided groups as negative consumption exter-
nalities we study how governments use taxation and public spending to mitigate conflict
created by social divisions.
The vast literature on diversity and public policy focuses primarily on how governments
allocate public funds in the face of diversity, often modeled as heterogeneous preferences
for a public good. In most models, this heterogeneity in preferences leads to an overall
smaller size of the government compared to an economy without diverse social groups.
We, on the other hand, focus on how public spending and taxation regulate conflict
between socially divided groups. In our model, governments use taxes to limit the exter-
nalities of consumption created in the cultural sphere, such as celebration of Ramadan
and Lent, and invest instead in secular celebrations, such as the 4th of July, which do
not create cultural externalities. In contrast to much of the literature, we conclude that
more diversity leads to a bigger size of the government.
We contribute to the theoretical analysis of diversity and public policy in two important
ways. First, we distinguish government types by the way different groups are prioritized
in public policy decision making. This generalization allows us to explain how changes
in diversity influence public policy outcomes. The flexibility of social weights that define
’government types’ allows us to analyze the interplay between diversity and specific po-
litical processes such as majority voting where social weights are endogenized. According
to our model, when there is majority voting and the majority group includes the median
voter, public policy is aimed at reducing the externalities faced by the majority group.
From this analysis we derive predictions about the relationship between taxation and
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public spending for different levels of diversity. We test these predictions using U.S. city
and county data on ethnic diversity from 1990 provided in Alesina et al. [1999]. We find
significant evidence for the existence of sizeable ‘diversity taxes’. Controlling for a vari-
ety of socioeconomic indicators, we document that the average U.S. city in 1990 would
have experienced a decrease in local taxes per capita of nearly 16% if the population had
been completely homogenized. These results are qualitatively robust to an instrumental
variable approach controlling for potential endogeneity.
Our second theoretical contribution is to disentangle the impact of different dimensions
of diversity on government regulation of social conflict. In the literature on ethnic diver-
sity, polarization and fractionalization indices are commonly used to measure diversity.
We incorporate these measure into our model by distinguishing increases in diversity due
to the increasing size of an already existing group (intensive margin) and due to the ad-
dition of a new group (extensive margin). While fractionalization increases both at the
extensive and the intensive margin, polarization increases at the intensive margin and
decreases at the extensive margin. This theoretical distinction allows us to study the
impact of finer definitions of diversity on public policy. To further explore our proposed
channel from diversity to public policy in the data, we test the predictions of our model
along the intensive margin of diversity by exploring how diversity within the minority
affects taxation. Our model predicts that more ethnic fractionalization of the minority
group increases the total externalities imposed on the majority group which induces the
majority group to impose higher local taxes. This prediction is confirmed in the data.
Ethnic fractionalization of the minority group significantly and positively influences taxes
per capita within U.S. cities in 1990. This finding corroborates our hypothesized link be-
tween cultural diversity and public policy through negative consumption externalities.
In our theoretical setup, the main mechanism that increases taxes is an increase in the
externalities imposed on a prioritized group. These externalities can be increased in two
ways. One way is if groups increase in size. Bigger groups create larger externalities on
other groups. A more subtle way is the shift in sizes of the groups creating externalities
on the prioritized group. Consider an increase in diversity that keeps the size of the
prioritized group the same but fragments the other groups. In our model, smaller groups
create more externalities per capita but less externalities in total, i.e. total cultural con-
sumption of a group is concave in its size. So even if the group that creates the largest
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externality becomes smaller due to fragmentation, the increase in the size of the smaller
groups increases the overall externalities faced by the prioritized group. This effect is
most pronounced when one considers a government that favors a minority group. When
diversity increases at the intensive margin, the size of the majority reduces. However, the
increase in the size of minority groups results in an overall increase in externalities. This
induces minority governments to increase taxes when diversity is increasing. Another im-
plication of the concavity of cultural good consumption is that when governments favor
a majority, a more fragmented minority creates more externalities than a big minority.
We find strong evidence for this impact of minorty fragmentation in the data where an
increase in ethnic fractionalization of the minority increases taxes per capita significantly
after controlling for the size of the majority. This theoretical prediction and the sugges-
tive evidence we find in the data for more social conflict as a result of smaller minorities
adds a novel aspect to the literature on the relationship between ethnic polarization,
conflict and public policy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.1.1 contrasts our setup and
findings to the literature on diversity, public policy, and conflict. Section 3.2 presents our
theoretical model which we use to study the relationship between diversity, government
type, and taxation. In this section, 3.2.1 sets up the model and 3.2.2 establishes and
discusses the key results of the theoretical analysis. In 3.2.3, we discuss the inclusion
of a political process like majority voting. We further discuss the relationship between
majority voting government regulation and a fragmented minority. Section 3.3 modifies
our general model to derive predictions which we test using U.S. city and county data.
In this section, we discuss multiple robustness checks and address potential endogeneity
concerns. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.1.1 Related Literature
There is a large literature on the effect of diversity on public spending and public good
provision. Stichnoth and Van der Straeten [2013] provide a comprehensive survey of
recent empirical work that illustrates the complicated evidence of the impact diversity
has on government expenditure and public good provision. However, there is a gap in
the literature on the direct effect of diversity on taxes.
As far as the indirect effect is concerned, a lot of the evidence points to a negative
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relationship between public spending and ethnic diversity. Alesina and Glaeser [2004]
and Alesina et al. [2001] discuss how differences in public spending in the US and Europe
can be explained by differing levels of ethnic diversity. Specifically, they explore the
redistribution channels of public spending and find that the more homogeneous Europe
has higher levels of redistribution than the more heterogeneous US. This is attributed to a
coordination failure between groups that do not like to share the benefits of redistribution
with other groups. We view these results as complimentary to our model as we claim that
taxes are imposed on groups in order to control spending on cultural goods that create
externalities. The finding of lower levels of redistribution in highly diverse societies
strengthens our prediction that cultural good consumption is being more aggressively
regulated in diverse countries which reduce disposable income to diverse cultural groups.
More specifically, we find that in U.S. city and county data from 1990, diversity has no
significant effect on public welfare spending.
The political economy of public good provision and diversity remains contested. When
diversity is negatively correlated with public good provision (Alesina et al. [1999], Hopkins
[2009], Spolaore and Wacziarg [2017], Alesina et al. [2019]), it has been attributed to
coordination failures due to heterogenous public good preferences. When diversity has
been positively correlated to public good provision (Gisselquist et al. [2016], Gisselquist
[2014], Banerjee and Somanathan [2007]), it has been attributed to ‘diversity dividends’
that arise when politically competing social groups keep each other in check for the
provision of public goods. We remain neutral about these findings as our results do not
depend on the public good provided per se. While our model incorporates secular good
provision, it is not central to our analysis. We also do not find any conclusive evidence
about the effect of diversity on public good provision like education and hospitals. Our
findings highlight that if public goods are a means to reduce conflict between divided
groups, then the provision of public goods increases with diversity as we find in this
paper. This finding, however, does not contradict the notion that if public goods are
solely a productive public good, then miscoordination within a society can result in a
negative relationship between diversity and public good provision as other authors have
argued (Alesina et al. [2019]). Hence, we see our findings as complementary to the findings
by previous work about the relationship between public good provision and diversity. The
main contribution of our paper is to introduce the concept of ‘diversity taxes’ imposed
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by governments to regulate consumption externalities created between groups. We find
strong evidence in the data for this hypothesis.
Measuring diversity has also been a contentious issue when using it as an indicator
for conflict (Somanathan [2018]). This is because diversity has several dimension that
can affect conflict and coordination between groups. Esteban et al. [2010] have shown
that polarization, a proxy for group competition, may be a better measurement of ethnic
friction than ethnic fractionalization which solely measures the relative sizes of groups.
We incorporate these distinctions in our empirical analysis and are able to predict the
effect of these different measurements on taxes. A contribution of our paper is to identify
the effects of finer definitions of diversity, such as the size of the majority group and
fractionalization within the minority, on public policy outcomes such as taxes.
Theoretical papers such as Fernández and Levy [2008] and Ghosh and Mitra [2016] try
to explain the political economy of diversity, public spending and ethnic good provision by
directly constraining the political process. Fernández and Levy [2008] use an endogenous
party formation explanation, while Ghosh and Mitra [2016] explain how dictatorships
and democracies differ in their provision of ethnic goods and redistributive transfers.
Our paper departs from these papers as we assume that the government can control the
consumption of cultural goods through individuals’ disposable income. This collapses an
otherwise multi-dimensional policy decision to a one-dimensional decision about a tax
rate. This abstraction is in line with the idea that governments can mitigate cultural
conflict through instruments that only roughly translate a multi-dimensional preference
space into optimal policy. Furthermore, this constrains government expenditure decisions
in a way that allows more degrees of freedom for the type of governments and political
processes.
3.2 Model
This section sets up and discusses the results of the model for government taxation of
cultural consumption externalities. The setup is discussed in section 3.2.1 and the main
results for the relationship between different types of diversity and the government type
are discussed in section 3.2.2. In that section, we discuss how we interpret diversity
changing at the intensive and the extensive margin. We define a government type by
the weights it puts on the different groups in the society. By focusing on three govern-
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ment types (majority, minority and utilitarian) we are able to distinguish three different
functional forms of the equilibrium government tax. These depend on the types of ex-
ternalities that enter a government’s objective function. Section 3.2.3 contains further
discussion on equilibrium taxes for the political process of majority voting, and minority
fragmentation at the intensive margin.
3.2.1 Setup
The model is a two stage game. In the first stage, the government chooses the tax rate on
labor income for the entire economy. In the second stage, agents allocate their post-tax
labor income between private and cultural good consumption. The government uses its
tax revenue to provide a ’secular’ public good. Hence, the relative consumption of pri-
vate, cultural, and secular goods in the equilibrium of this two-stage game is regulated
by the government tax rate.
We consider a continuum of agents in [0, 1] where each agent belongs to a social group
i ∈ M = {1, 2, ...,m}. An agent from group i inelastically supplies one unit of labor to
the labor market where he obtains a fixed wage rate w. The government sets a tax rate t
which is applied to an agent’s labor market income. Group i allocates its post-tax wage
income (1 − t)w between per-capita cultural good consumption, ei, and per-capita pri-
vate goods consumption, ci.35 Cultural good consumption by one group creates negative
externalities on agents belonging to other groups. The government can mitigate these
externalities by taxing labor market incomes and using the proceeds to provide a secular
public good, g. This public good is equally enjoyed by all agents from all groups. The
government is restricted to apply the same tax rate to all agents.
The government chooses its tax rate through backward induction. It is constrained by
the optimization problem of the groups in a social group and a budget constraint for the
expenditure on the secular good, g. We present the second stage first.
35For the sake of simplicity, we assume away the problem of voluntary contributions of agents to total
cultural consumption and the resulting free-riding problem. Instead, we assume that each cultural group
has a government body that is able to impose a fixed per-capita consumption of cultural good on all
members of the group. This is akin to a situation in which the per-capita consumption of cultural good
is decided by a vote by all members of the group. As members within a group have the same utility and
budget constraints, the desired per-capita cultural consumption is the same for all group members.
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Second Stage: Cultural Group Optimization Problem
An agent from group i has the following utility function








with α, β, γ, δ > 0. For the rest of the paper we normalize δ to 1. Ei = φiei is the
total cultural good consumption by group i ∈ M where φi ∈ (0, 1) is the size of group




the total amount of negative externalities imposed on group i. We assume that ν ∈
(0, 1) and ρ < 0. That is, returns to total consumption are decreasing, and private and
cultural consumption are complements.36 Our setup implies that there are two types of
externalities between agents in this economy. First, there is a negative externality that
is created by the exposure to the cultural good consumption of other groups. Second,
there is positive externality created by same-group members who all contribute to their
common cultural good consumption.
For a given tax rate t, group i optimizes the cultural and private good consumption
facing the following budget constraint:
ei + ci = w(1− t) (3.2)
Thus, the optimization problem for group i is given by:
max
ci,Ei
ui(Ei, E−i, ci, g)
s.t. ei + ci = w(1− t)
Ci (3.3)
The c∗i and E∗i = φie∗i that solve Ci will be functions of the exogenous variables w,
φm = (φ1, ..., φm), and the tax rate, t, set by the government. As φm is the distribution
vector of group sizes, it holds that ∑
i∈M
φi = 1.
36The assumption of complementarity between cultural and private consumption is essential for our
main results. If cultural and private consumption were substitutes (ρ > 0), then some of our results would
be reversed. We are confident in the assumption of complementarity since the predictions derived from
the theory align with the empirical evidence we present later, and since private (secular) and cultural
consumption seem sufficiently interdependent to render complementarity a natural assumption.
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First Stage: Government Optimization Problem
Through backward induction the government sets a tax rate which maximizes its objective
function. A government’s objective function depends on the social weights it puts on the
different cultural groups given by vector λm = (λ1, ..., λm) and the size of each group
given by the distribution vector φm. The government’s budget constraint is given by:
g = wt (3.4)
The government maximizes its objective function based on the consumption decisions









s.t. g = tw








where λm is normalized such that
∑
i∈M λi = 1.
3.2.2 Results
Second stage solution:
Solving for Ci for group i ∈ M gives the solutions for private good consumption, c∗i (t),
and cultural good consumption, E∗i (t). We obtain











 ≡ (1− t)κc(φi) (3.5)




























































Note that both the total cultural good consumption by group i, E∗i (t), as well as private
good consumption per capita, c∗i (t), are increasing and concave in group size φi. The
concavity of total cultural consumption in group size implies that negative externalities
increase by a larger amount when smaller groups become bigger compared to already
large groups becoming even larger.
The government can reduce consumption externalities created in the economy by in-
creasing t. It prioritizes the externalities imposed on different groups based on the social
weights it applies to each group.
First stage solution: equilibrium government tax rate
Using the solutions from the maximization problem at the group level to solve Gλm(φm),
we get a closed form solution for the equilibrium tax rate, t∗λm(φm).
Lemma 3.1. For a given number of groups m and distribution of size over groups,
φm = (φ1, ..., φm), the sub-game perfect equilibrium tax rate set by the government with
social weight distribution over groups, λm = (λ1, ..., λm), is given by


















with Ωλm(φm) > 0.
Proof. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Lemma 3.1 tells us that the relationship between the equilibrium tax rate, diversity (φm)
and government (λm) parameters is fully described by the variable Ωλm(φm). Ωλm(φm)
represents the ratio between the total welfare gain from increasing taxes, through reduc-
tion of total externalities and provision of the public good, and the total welfare loss of
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increasing taxes, through the reduction of consumption of own-cultural and consumption
goods. We call Ωλm(φm) the government benefit to loss ratio of cultural regulation. Note
that when φi = 1, i.e. when there is only one group in the economy, then
∑
j 6=i
κE(φj) = 0 as
there are no negative externalities created. This lowers the benefit of taxation compared
to the scenario with other groups present in the economy (φi < 1). As a result, a fully
homogeneous society sets a lower tax rate than a heterogeneous society. Thus, ceteris
paribus, the presence of negative consumption externalities created through cultural di-
versity increases tax rates. This is our notion of ’diversity taxes’.
The formulation in Lemma 3.1 allows us to neatly study how the interaction between
different dimensions of diversity and the government type impact taxation, all through
the variable Ωλm(φm).
Corollary 3.1. The equilibrium tax rate t∗λm(φm) is monotonically increasing in Ωλm(φm).
We proceed to define three types of government, at a given φm, which have different
functional forms of the government benefit to loss ratio of cultural regulation, Ωλm(φm).
Without loss of generality we assume group 1 is the biggest group in the economy with
m groups:
Assumption 3.1. For a given φm = (φ1, ..., φm)
1. φ1 > 1m
2. φj = 1−φ1m−1 ∀ j 6= 1
Definition 3.1. For a given m and φm = (φ1, ..., φm)
1. A utilitarian government has an objective function with λi = λj = 1m ∀i, j ∈M .
2. A majority government has an objective function with λ1 = 1.
3. A minority government i has an objective function with λi = 1 where i 6= 1.
The distribution of λm characterizes which groups the government cares about. A ma-
jority government only prioritizes the majority group which puts all the social weight
on its members, the minority government prioritizes only a minority group, and a utili-
tarian government is controlled by a benevolent dictator prioritizing each agent equally.
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The groups that are prioritized by the government through λm determine the external-
ities that are prioritized by the government when taxes are imposed. This is clear by
the changes in the government benefit to loss ratio of cultural regulation, Ωλm(φm), for
different values of λm.
Corollary 3.2. Take m as given and φm = (φ1, ..., φm).





























While a utilitarian government regulates the total externalities created in the entire econ-
omy, a minority or majority government only regulates the negative externalities which
the group that controls them faces.
From our definitions, a majority government focuses solely on the negative external-
ities imposed on the majority group. As the majority group faces the least cultural
externalities among the groups in the economy, a majority government imposes a smaller
tax than either the minority group or the utilitarian group. Conversely, the smallest
group faces the largest externalities. Hence, a minority government which prioritizes the
smallest group imposes the highest taxes compared to any other minority or majority
government. This result is summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.1. For a given φm = (φ1, ..., φm), t∗mini(φm) ≥ t
∗
u(φm) ≥ t∗maj(φm).
Here, t∗u(φm), t∗maj(φm) and t∗mini(φm) are the equilibrium tax rates imposed by a util-
itarian government, a majoritarian and a minority government respectively for a given
distribution of groups φm.
Comparative statics of tax rates with respect to diversity
In our model, the distribution vector φm captures two different dimensions of diversity.
First, the length of φm describes the number of groups within a society. Second, the
elements of φm describe how agents are distributed into different groups. That is, we are
able to separate two dimensions of diversity through our distribution vector φm. One
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dimension of change is how agents are distributed between groups for a fixed m. We call
this change in diversity a change of diversity at the intensive margin. A change along the
intensive margin implies a change in the elements of φm. The other dimension of change
that we define is at the extensive margin where we fix the proportion of one group and
allow for the number of groups, m, to increase. Given Assumption 3.1, φ1 is a proxy
for the change of diversity along the intensive margin. As group 1 is assumed to be the
majority, for a fixed m, an increase in φ1 is a decrease in diversity along the intensive
margin. Diversity increases at the extensive margin when we increase m, for a fixed φ1.
Taxation and intensive margin diversity
Higher diversity at the intensive margin means a lower value of φ1 with m being fixed.
For a given φ1 > 1/m, the majority faces lower externalities than the minority group.
Hence, total externalities in the society decrease as intensive margin diversity decreases.37
Proposition 3.2. Let φ1 > 1m then:










Proposition 3.2 shows that there is a negative relationship between diversity along the
intensive margin (φ1) and equilibrium taxation. Remember that the government sets tax
rates so as to reduce the amount of negative externalities faced by the group it cares about.
The majority government only cares about the welfare of the majority group. When the
majority group gets larger (φ1 increases), then all other m− 1 minority groups decrease
in size equally. Since the total externalities produced by any cultural group is increasing
in its group size, this implies that the total amount of externalities of the m− 1 minorty
groups decreases. Thus, the majority group faces lower negative externalities and, as a
result, the majority government decreases taxes in response to an increase in the size of
37We omit the discussion of the utilitarian government since this case does not yield unambiguous




Similarly, the minority government only internalizes the negative externalities imposed
on a given minority group. Fixing the size of this minority group, an increase in the size
of the majority group (increase in φ1) leads to an increase in the externalities created
through the majority group, and a decrease in the externalities created through the other
minority groups. Due to the concavity of the creation of total externalities in group
size, the total externalities created in this economy go down. That is, the decrease in
externalities by minority groups outweigh the increase in externalities by the majority
group. As a result, the minority government reduces taxation in response to an increasing
majority group size.
Taxation and extensive margin diversity
At the extensive margin, diversity increases as the number of groups, m, increases while
holding φ1 constant. When an additional small group comes into the society, we find that
it increases externalities across the board for all previously existing groups.
Proposition 3.3. Given φ1,
• for the majority government:
tmaj(φ1,m+ 1)− tmaj(φ1,m) > 0
• for a minority government i ∈ {1, ...,m}:
tmini(φ1,m+ 1)− tmini(φ1,m) > 0
Proposition 3.3 implies that any majority or minority government that existed before
the creation of a new group will increase taxes with the introduction of this new group.
While a new group results in smaller minority groups, it increases the total amount of
negative externalities imposed on all the old groups. This result is again driven by the
concavity of a group’s consumption of the cultural good. The introduction of a new
group reduces the size of existing smaller groups which makes them consume less of their
cultural good as a group, but more of their own cultural goods per capita. This implies
that the decrease in total externalities from existing groups is smaller than the increase
in externalities from the newly added group. As a result, all existing groups face more
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total negative externalities when a new group is introduced. This results in higher taxes
for all governments that prioritize a previously existing social group.
3.2.3 Extensions
In this section we discuss two extensions to the baseline model. First, we explore the
relationship between the equilibrium tax and diversity if we add the political process
of majority voting. Second, we study the relationship between fragmentation of the
minority group at the intensive margin. Both these results are important when we test
the predictions from our model on the data.
Majority voting
So far we have made no assumptions on the political process of how a government chooses
taxes. Suppose we add a stage to the game with majority voting over taxes before the
government sets the taxes. Group i’s individual tax rate, t∗i (φm), that solves (3.9) with
λ+ i = 1, is well-defined. This means that the median voter tax policy is well-defined. If
the majority group is the median voter then, t∗maj(φm) is imposed. If the minority group
is the median voter, t∗min(φm) is imposed. We know from Proposition 3.1 that smaller
groups prefer higher taxes than bigger groups. This means if φ1 < 0.5, the majority group
is no longer the median voter and a minority group chooses it’s most preferred taxes as
the median voter. This gives us the following result:
Proposition 3.4. Suppose m ≥ 3. In a political process of majority voting, the equi-
librium regulatory tax will be t∗med(φ1,m) = t∗maj(φ1,m) for φ1 > 0.5, and t∗med(φ1,m) =
t∗min(φ1,m) for φ1 < 0.5
Proposition 3.4 says that there is a discontinuity in t∗med(φ1,m) at φ1 = 0.5 when m ≥ 3.
This discontinuity at φ1 = 0.5 is a result of majority voting. At φ1 = 0.5 the government
switches from prioritizing the majority group to prioritizing a minority which means
higher taxes than t∗maj(0.5,m). Given part 1 of Proposition 3.2 this means that for
φ1 > 0.5 the tax rate is decreasing with φ1. For φ1 < 0.5, assume that φ1 > φ2 > ... > φm,
and that when the size of the biggest group increases, then only the size of the smallest









j>i φj < 0.5 and φi > 0.5 −
∑
j>i φj, it holds that
∂t∗i (φm)
∂φ1
< 0. This result is again
driven by the fact that cultural good consumption is concave in group size φi. As the
smaller groups get smaller, the reduction in its contribution to externalities outweighs the
increase in the externalities produced by the majority group. If, however, the smallest
group is the median voter (which is only possible when φ1 = φ2... = φm = 1/m), then it






Fragmentation of the minority group
In Proposition 3.3 we explored the relationship between taxes and fragmentation of the
minority at the extensive margin as minorities became smaller through the introduction
of a new group. We established that higher fragmentation at the extensive margin un-
ambiguously leads to an increase in taxes. In this section, we explore how fragmentation
of the minority affects taxation at the intensive margin.
Without loss of generality assume that group 2 is the largest minority group i.e.
φ2 ∈ ( 1m−1 , φ1). Again, for simplicity we assume that all other smaller minority groups
are of the same size, specifically, φi = 1−φ1−φ2m−2 ∀i ∈M\{1, 2}. Similar to φ1, φ2 is a proxy
of the fragmentation within the minority. Higher φ2 implies lower fragmentation of the
minority at the intensive margin.
Assume that the political process is majority voting. Then, for φ1 > 0.5 we have ma-
jority government taxes. For φ1 < 0.5 and φ1 + φ2 > 0.5 the biggest minority group,
group 2, is the median voter.38
Proposition 3.5. Suppose m ≥ 3. Assume that the political process is majority voting.








38We omit the case of φ1 + φ2 < 0.5 in which a smaller minority group sets the tax rate since this
case does not yield unambiguous predictions for general parameter values.
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The second part of the proposition states that if group 2 is the median voter, then taxes
decline as φ2 increases. Clearly, as group 2 grows larger smaller minority groups become
smaller and externalities imposed on it decline. The first part of the proposition reveals
that if there is a big enough majority group then increases in φ2 results in lower taxes.
This is because as φ2 becomes larger the increase in the negative externality on group 1
by group 2 is less than the decrease in negative externalities coming from all the other
smaller groups. In other words, higher fragmentation of the minority group results in
higher taxes imposed by the majority government. We use this particular result when
testing our predictions using U.S. data.
3.3 Empirical Evaluation
In this section, we provide empirical evidence for ’diversity taxes’ using U.S. data from
Alesina et al. [1999]. The theoretical analysis in the previous section makes predictions
about how intensive and extensive margin variations in diversity affect government taxa-
tion and spending. In addition, it relates these predictions to the outcome of the political
process (majority versus minority governments). Unfortunately, intensive and extensive
margin variations have no counterpart in the data. Instead, empirical work has used
fractionalization and polarization indices as measures of diversity to study the effect of
diversity on conflict and public spending (Alesina et al. [2000], Esteban et al. [2010], Mon-
talvo and Reynal-Querol [2005]). Fractionalization (Taylor and Hudson [1972]) is defined





Polarization captures how far the distribution of groups is from a bipolar distribution
which represents the highest level of polarization. We use the Reynal-Querol index








Both indices are imperfect measures for our two-dimensional specification of diversity.
More specifically, fractionalization and polarization move in opposite directions at the
extensive margin and at the intensive margin fractionalization and polarization mono-
tonically decreases with φ1.
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Lemma 3.2. Assume φm = (φ1, 1−φ1m−1 , ...,
1−φ1
m−1 )
At the extensive margin:
• If φ1 ∈ (1/m, 1) ∀ m > 2, ∆FRAC∆m > 0.
• If φ1 ∈ (1/m, 1) ∀ m > 2, ∆POL∆m < 0.
At the intensive margin:
• If m > 2 ∀ φ1 ∈ (1/m, 1), ∂FRAC∂φ1 < 0.
• If m > 2 ∀ φ1 ∈ (1/m, 1), ∂POL∂φ1 < 0.
At the intensive margin, FRAC decreases with φ1 because the probability of meeting
other groups decreases as small groups become smaller, whereas POL decreases with
φ1 as minority groups become smaller they move further away from the distribution
(1/2, 1/2, 0, ..., 0). At the extensive margin, more number of groups increase FRAC be-
cause of increased probability of randomly meeting a member of different group, whereas
more groups enlarge the difference between the sizes of the majority and the largest mi-
nority, decreasing POL.
The data set provided by Alesina et al. [1999] contains a fixed number of ethnic groups
and hence, it rules out any analysis along the extensive margin of diversity. As a result,
we will adjust our theoretical framework to derive predictions specific to the intensive
margin variation of diversity. Before doing so, we will briefly describe the data we use to
conduct our empirical analysis.
3.3.1 Data and Sources
Alesina et al. [1999] provide a comprehensive database on ethnic fractionalization and
public finances for three levels of U.S. urban localities in the year 1990: cities, counties,










where Racei denotes the share of population self-identified as of race i where
i = {White, Black, Asian and Pacific Islander, American Indian, Other}
This racial classification is adopted from the U.S. Census. It is noteworthy that Hispanics
as an ethnic group fall under the category “Other”. Table 3.1 gives a description of all the
variables we employ from the data set.40 To test our hypothesis about the existence of
’diversity taxes’, we use the data on population distribution by race to construct a variety
of indices measuring the degree of ethnic fragmentation. More specifically, we construct
an index of ethnic polarization as in (3.14) which captures how far the distribution of
ethnic groups is from a bipolar distribution. The index size of majority group measures
the dominance of one ethnic group. With fractionalization of minority and size of biggest
minority group we try to capture the fragmentation of the minority groups. Below we will
derive distinct theoretical predictions for how we expect these different ethnic diversity
variables to impact local taxes per capita.
A second set of variables concerns government finances on the local level. For all three
levels of aggregation (city, county, and metropolitan areas), we have data on general local
government expenditures per capita as well as total local government taxes per capita.
The data set also allows us to break down general expenditure into specific categories
(health spending, education spending, police spending, welfare spending, and others),
although sometimes only at county or metro level. We also observe the debt per capita
local government debt outstanding per capita on the county and metro level. Finally, the
Alesina et al. [1999] data set allows us to control for a variety of factors beyond ethnic
diversity which might affect local government taxation and spending, such as population
size, the percentage of people above 25 with a Bachelor’s degree or higher, fraction of the
population above 65, violent crimes per capita, median and mean income per capita, as
well as mean-to-median income (as a measure of inequality). Table 3.2 provides summary
statistics for all variables in our data set (at city level).
3.3.2 Modified Model
Given the data availability described above, we make the following modifications to our
general model. Assume that diversity changes only at the intensive margin and keep m
40A detailed description of the data set and data sources can be found in Alesina et al. [1999].
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fixed. Further assume that the majority group is the median voter i.e. φ1 > 0.5 and
λ1 = 1. This implies that the majority group is effectively setting its most preferred tax
rate. The majority group will set a tax rate which is positively related to the total amount
of externalities that the minority groups as a whole impose on the majority group.
Corollary 3.3. Assume m is fixed and φ1 > 0.5. Then the tax parameter t∗ is chosen by
the majority and positively correlated with the total amount of externalities imposed on
the majority group.
Thus, our model predicts that for localities in which there is a majority, local government
taxes per capita are positively correlated with the amount of externalities imposed on the
majority group. In the following, we present a set of testable predictions based on how
ethnic composition impacts the negative externalities imposed on the majority group.
In the modified version of our model, all variation in diversity occurs along the intensive
margin, i.e. through changes in the distribution of people over a fixed number of ethnic
groups (i.e. through the vector φm). Proposition 3.2 showed that an increase in the size
of the majority leads to a decrease in the total amount of externalities imposed on the
majority group. As a result, our first prediction is that the majority government imposes
a lower tax rate as the size of the majority increases.
Prediction 3.1. Total local government taxes per capita are negatively correlated with




Furthermore, Lemma 3.2 showed that both the fractionalization index as well as the
polarization index decrease when the majority group grows bigger. This implies that
the total amount of negative externalities imposed on the majority group is increasing in
fractionalization and polarization. This gives rise to our second prediction.
Prediction 3.2. Both the fractionalization index and the polarization index are positively
correlated with local government taxes per capita.
Next, consider variations in the composition of the minority groups. More specifically,
assume that the biggest minority group gets bigger (i.e. φ2 increases) while holding the
size of the majority constant. From Proposition 3.5 we know that this reduces the total
amount of externalities imposed on the majority group. As a result, the tax rate set by
the majority government will decrease.
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Prediction 3.3. Total local government taxes per capita are negatively correlated with




In our model, φ2 measures the size of the biggest minority group and as such is also
a proxy for the relative sizes of the minority groups. This comes from the simplifying
assumption that other minority groups are the same size. When looking at the data,
the level of fractionalization within the minority is a related indicator of how cultural










As group 2 is the biggest minority, this implies that ∂FRACMIN
∂φ2
< 0. That is, as group
2 gets smaller, minority groups become more similar in size and the fractionalization of
the minority groups increases. This increases the total amount of externalities imposed
on the majority group. From this observation we obtain our final prediction from the
theoretical analysis.
Prediction 3.4. Total local government taxes per capita are positively correlated with
the fractionalization of minority groups.
In the next subsection, we test our four theoretical predictions on the data set from
Alesina et al. [1999]. We have excluded metropolitan area level data for two reasons.
First, very few of the regressions we ran resulted in any significant relationships between
dependent variables and independent variables.41 Second, our theory rests on negative
consumption externalities between ethnically diverse groups. We expect such externalities
to be most relevant on the smallest levels of observation, i.e. city and county level.
Metropolitan area level data is rather aggregated and might mask the channel from
diversity to taxation we wish to explore. Hence, we restrict attention to city and county
level data. Furthermore, as our theoretical predictions are derived under the assumption
that there is a majority government, we drop all cities and counties from the sample in
41Metropolitan area level data contains the fewest observations (311) compared to city level (1076)
and county level (1400) data, thus reducing the chances of finding statistically significant relationships
between variables within the data.
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which there is no majority, i.e. in which no ethnic group has more than 50% share of the
population.42
3.3.3 Results
We find evidence in the data for all four of our theoretical predictions. We structure the
discussion of our empirical results around these four predictions.
Documenting diversity taxes: taxes per capita and ethnic fractionalization
We first test Prediction 3.2 from above. We expect the fractionalization index of ethnic
diversity to be positively correlated with taxes per capita. Table 3.3 presents results
from a regression analysis on city level data. We regress different fiscal variables on an
ethnic fractionalization index as constructed in (3.15). The first two columns of the table
present our results from the city-level analysis. In the first column of the table we regress
taxes per capita on ethnic fractionalization and various city-level controls. We find that
ethnic fractionalization is positively influencing taxes per capita. This finding is statisti-
cally significant after controlling for income per capita, population size, fraction of people
above 25 with a Bachelor’s degree or higher, inequality, fraction of the population above
65, violence per capita, and state-fixed effects. We conclude that the data confirms our
prediction about the impact of fractionalization on local taxation.43 To quantify the rel-
evance of the impact of diversity on local government taxation, consider the average U.S.
city in 1990. No diversity (fully homogeneous population) results in $248.77 of taxes per
capita for such an otherwise average city, while maximum diversity would imply taxes per
capita of $415.64. Fully homogenizing U.S. cities in 1990 would reduce taxes per capita
by an average of 15.96%. This suggest that ’diversity taxes’ are significant and relevant
drivers of both the level and the variation of city taxes per capita observed in the data.
The second column of Table 3.3 presents the results from regressing total city govern-
ment expenditures per capita on ethnic fractionalization and the various controls. We
find a positive and significant effect of fractionalization on expenditures. This is in line
42This implies dropping 31 cities, reducing the sample of cities from 1076 to 1045, and dropping 6
counties, reducing the sample of counties from 1400 to 1394. Hence, this sub-sampling of the data comes
with little reduction of sample size.
43We ran the same type of regression with ethnic polarization as in (3.14) and found a positive and
significant effect as well.
105
3 DIVERSITY TAXES
with our prediction that more diversity leads to more provision of (secular) public goods
as a by-product of the government regulating negative externalities arising from diver-
sity through taxation. The effect of ethnic diversity on local exenditures per capita is
of considerable size (although less significant than the impact of diversity on taxation).
The government of a fully homogenized city (ETHNIC = 0) in the U.S. in 1990 spends
$215.14 less than its fully heterogenized counterpart (ETHNIC = 1). Fully homogeniz-
ing U.S. cities in 1990 would reduce government expenditures per capita by an average
of 6.98%.
The third and fourth column of Table 3.3 repeat the analysis for county-level data.
We find that ethnic fractionalization has a positive and significant impact on taxes per
capita.44 The magnitude of this impact is less than on the city level. Fully homogenizing
U.S. counties in 1990 would reduce taxes per capita by an average of 4.9%. Similarly,
ethnic fractionalization positively and significantly impacts expenditure per capita on
county level. Fully homogenizing U.S. counties in 1990 would reduce expenditure per
capita by an average of 6.46%. We conclude that ‘diversity taxes’ are impactful on the
county level, although less so than on city level. This is in line with our hypothesis that
negative externalities from cultural diversity mostly arise in interactions between people
in small localities, i.e. neighborhoods or cities. County level data also includes a spend-
ing category ‘Public Welfare’. Our proposed channel from diversity to taxation implies
that the government does not redistribute its tax revenues back to the different groups
through public transfers, but rather spends the revenues on secular goods (roads, sewage,
police, schools, hospitals etc.). Table 3.5 reports the results from regressing several pub-
lic expenditure categories on ethnic fractionalization. We find no significant relationship
between the fractionalization and the share of welfare spending on county level. This
strengthens our notion of a government which taxes the consumption of cultural goods
and provides secular goods instead. Table 3.5 shows that neither the spending share
for education nor for hospitals is significantly correlated with ethnic diversity. Only the
county level share of expenditures on roads is significant and negatively correlated with
ethnic fractionalization.45 We conclude that there is a significant and positive impact
44We ran regressions with our polarization index and obtained qualitatively similar and significant
result.
45This observation is in line with the findings of Alesina et al. (1999). They hypothesize that more
ethnic fractionalization leads to less ’productive’ public provision (roads, education, sewerage) due to
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of ethnic fractionalization on both taxes per capita and expenditures per capita. How-
ever, there is a less significant relationship between ethnic fractionalization and specific
expenditure categories. Importantly for us, ethnic fractionalization does not significantly
increase welfare spending.
Regressing taxes per capita on ethnic fractionalization might be problematic if taxes
per capita have a causal impact on ethnic diversity. To address this endogeneity concern,
we follow Alesina et al. [1999] and instrument ethnic fractionalization in 1990 by ethnic
fractionalization in 1980. This instrument is relevant as ethnic fractionalization in 1980 is
sufficiently correlated with ethnic fractionalization in 1990. The instrument is exogenous
as tax rates in 1990 cannot causally explain ethnic fractionalization in 1980. The results
from the two-stage-least squares are reported in Table 3.6. We find that the impact of
ethnic fractionalization on taxes per capita and expenditures per capita remains positive
and significant.
To sum up, data on U.S. cities and counties in 1990 confirm our prediction that more
ethnic diversity (as measured by fractionalization or polarization) leads to more govern-
ment taxation and public expenditure. However, mutliple explanations are possible for
this positive relationship between diversity and taxation. In the following, we try to
identify the empirical importance of our proposed channel by testing predictions from
our model which are specific to our notion of ’diversity taxes’.
Exploring the channel: taxes per capita, majority size and minority fragmentation
Our theoretical analysis predicts (i) a negative relation between taxes per capita and the
size of the majority (Prediction 3.1), (ii) a negative relation between taxes per capita
and the size of the biggest minority group (Prediction 3.3), and (iii) a positive relation
between taxes per capita and the fragmentation of majority groups (Prediction 3.4).
Table 3.4 reports the results from regressing taxes per capita on the different variables
of ethnic diversity on city and county level. We run two specifications per local level.
Both specifications test for the impact of the size of the majority as well the fragmentation
of the minority on local taxes per capita. In the first specification, we capture minority
fragmentation by the fractionalization of the minority. In the second specification, we use
the size of the biggest minority group as a measure of minority fragmentation. Consider
heterogeneity of preferences across ethnic groups.
107
3 DIVERSITY TAXES
columns (1) and (3) which show the results from regressing taxes per capita on the size of
the majority and the fractionalization of the minority. We find that the size of majority is
negatively impacting taxes per capita while fractionalization of the minority is positively
influencing taxes per capita, both on the city and on the county level. Next, consider
columns (2) and (4). We regress taxes per capita on the size of the majority group and
the size of the biggest minority group. Again, we obtain a significant negative impact
from the size of the majority on taxes per capita. In addition, we find that the size of
the biggest minority group is significantly and negatively affecting taxes per capita. We
conclude that prediction 1, prediction 3, and prediction 4 are confirmed. We believe that
the evidence presented in Table 3.4 makes a strong case for the explanation of ‘diversity
taxes’ through the taxation of negative externalities. Our theoretical analysis establishes
a positive link between taxes per capita and total negative externalities imposed on the
majority group. As we discussed, this link is able to explain the direction and significance
of the coefficients reported in Table 3.4 which might otherwise be puzzling.
We conclude that the empirical evidence for U.S. cities and counties in 1990 confirms
the predictions from our theoretical analysis. More ethnic diversity (as measured by frac-
tionalization or polarization indices) leads to more taxes per capita and local government
expenditure per capita. We see this as evidence for ’diversity taxes’. Our model explains
the existence of these diversity taxes in the context of diverse groups imposing negative
consumption externalities on each other. We tested this theory by relating the total
amount of negative externalities imposed on the majority group by minority groups to
various characteristics of the distribution of groups. The empirical evidence confirms a
significant positive relationship between taxes per capita observed in the data and the
amount of negative externalities imposed on the majority as we infer it from the distri-
bution of groups. We see this as evidence for our hypothesized channel which relates
diversity to taxation.
3.4 Conclusion
We propose a model in which governments use taxes to control negative consumption ex-
ternalities created between diverse groups, thereby mitigating social conflict. We study
the relationship between different types of governments (majority and minority) and the
taxes they impose for a given level of diversity. We measure diversity along two different
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dimensions. One way to increase diversity is to increase the number of groups (extensive
margin), the other way is to decrease the size of the majority group (intensive margin).
We find that when diversity increases at the extensive margin, both majority and minor-
ity governments increase regulation. Similarly, when diversity increases at the intensive
margin, both majority and minority governments increase taxation as diversity increases.
One of the main predictions from our theoretical analysis is that more diversity leads
to a bigger size of the government as measured by taxes per capita. We test this pre-
diction using the U.S. city and county data provided by Alesina et al. [1999]. We find
robust and significant evidence for the existence of ’diversity taxes’ even after including
a variety of socioeconomic and demographic controls and after instrumenting for ethnic
fractionalization. We further document significant relationships between majority group
size and taxes as well as between minority fractionalization and taxes in line with the
predictions of our theory. These results lend credence to our notion of social conflict
manifesting itself in negative consumption externalities between diverse groups, and its
regulation through public policy.
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Table 3.1: Variable Description
(Observations are for 1990 unless otherwise noted)
Ethnicity
Ethnic Fractionalization Measures the probability that two persons drawn randomly from the population
belong to different self-identified ethnic groups; ranges from 0 to 1; ranges from
0 (complete homogeneity) to 1 (complete heterogeneity)
Ethnic Polarization Captures how far the distribution of the ethnic groups is from the (1/2, 0, 0, ...0, 1/2)
distribution (bipolar), which represents the highest level of polarization.
Fractionalization of Minority Measures the ethnic fractionalization of the population excluding the majority group
Size of Majority Group Majority group size as a fraction of the population
Size of Biggest Minority Group Size of second biggest group as a fraction of the population
Black Fraction of population self-identifying as Black
White Fraction of population self-identifying as White
Asian Fraction of population self-identifying as Asian or Pacific Islander
American Indian Fraction of population self-identifying as American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut
Other Race Fraction of population self-identifying as not Black, American Indian, Asian,
or White; proxy for Hispanic
Government
Expenditures per Capita General local government expenditure per capita, 1990-1991
Health Spending Fraction of general local government expenditure for health and hospitals
(county and metro only)
Education Spending Fraction of general local government expenditure for education
(county and metro only)
Police Spending Fraction of general local government expenditure for police
Welfare Spending Fraction of general local government expenditure for public welfare
(county and metro only)
Taxes per Capita Total local government taxes per capita, 1990-1991
Debt per Capita Per capita local government debt outstanding (county and metro only)
Income, Education, and Population
Population Size Log of population size
Percentage BA Graduate Persons 25 years and over, fraction with Bachelor’s degree or higher
Population above 65 Fraction of population that is 65 years or older
Violence per Capita Violent crimes per capita (murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault)
Income per Capita Per capita money income, 1989
Median household income Median household income, 1989
Mean-to-Median Income Ratio of mean to median household income
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for City Data (subset of cities with majority)
Variable Name Mean St. Dev. Min Max N Unit
Fractionalization Index 0.283 0.169 0.014 0.737 1,045 Fraction
Polarization Index 0.489 0.271 0.029 0.991 1,045 Fraction
Fractionalization of Minority 0.451 0.205 0.010 0.743 1,045 Fraction
Size of Majority Group 0.818 0.132 0.503 0.993 1,045 Fraction
Size of Biggest Minority Group 0.133 0.117 0.003 0.475 1,045 Fraction
Black 0.112 0.153 0.0004 0.981 1,045 Fraction
White 0.801 0.170 0.016 0.993 1,045 Fraction
Asian 0.037 0.072 0.0003 0.838 1,045 Fraction
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut 0.006 0.011 0.0003 0.138 1,045 Fraction
Other 0.044 0.074 0.0004 0.669 1,04 Fraction
Expenditures per Capita 872.883 555.759 161.000 7,154.000 991 $ per capita
Taxes per Capita 371.661 276.314 38.487 3,977.627 991 $ per capita
Population Size 10.961 0.759 10.127 15.806 1,045 Log of # people
Percentage BA Graduate 0.230 0.118 0.016 0.712 1,045 Fraction
Population above 65 0.126 0.052 0.020 0.485 1,045 Fraction
Violence per Capita 7.780 6.740 0.023 47.348 923 # crimes per capita
Income Per Capita 14,936.730 5,031.352 5,561 55,463 1,045 $ per capita
Mean-to-Median Income 1.263 0.139 1.030 2.247 1,045 Ratio
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Table 3.3: Fractionalization, Taxation and Public Spending
City Level County Level
Tax per Capita Exp per Capita Tax per Capita Exp per Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ethnic Fractionalization 166.863∗∗∗ 215.143∗ 165.145∗∗∗ 616.171∗∗∗
(60.108) (125.338) (54.653) (137.133)
Income per Capita 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
Log Population Size 47.518∗∗∗ 113.099∗∗∗ −7.101 1.435
(15.972) (29.431) (8.702) (18.906)
Education −59.211 64.019 −170.490 −429.975
(115.207) (259.619) (124.581) (284.288)
Inequality 225.917∗∗∗ 428.224∗∗ 131.340∗ 634.596∗∗∗
(80.312) (183.017) (75.052) (201.390)
Violence per Capita 5.270∗∗ 14.645∗∗∗ 13.854∗∗∗ 30.861∗∗∗
(2.240) (3.353) (2.223) (5.789)
Population Above 65 251.207∗ 516.633 852.521∗∗∗ 1, 061.297∗∗
(144.967) (367.303) (188.155) (425.416)
Debt per Capita 0.005 0.019∗
(0.003) (0.011)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 912 912 1,345 1,345
R2 0.692 0.629 0.789 0.630
Adjusted R2 0.673 0.605 0.780 0.614
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.4: Majority Size and Minority Fragmentation
Dependent Variable: Taxes per Capita
City Level County Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size of Majority −349.450∗∗∗ −622.170∗∗∗ −346.184∗∗∗ −723.692∗∗
(94.766) (237.568) (71.038) (294.014)
Fractionalization of Minority 182.803∗∗∗ 116.379∗∗∗
(61.521) (31.264)
Size of Biggest Minority Group −491.237∗ −522.388∗
(252.308) (295.083)
Income per Capita 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Log Population Size 44.026∗∗∗ 45.795∗∗∗ −5.835 −8.657
(16.173) (16.118) (8.769) (8.915)
Education −76.389 −74.880 −183.286 −160.033
(113.974) (117.475) (124.828) (124.355)
Inequality 243.188∗∗∗ 234.791∗∗∗ 96.491 90.828
(79.583) (81.757) (72.909) (73.574)
Violence per Capita 4.934∗∗ 4.711∗∗ 13.125∗∗∗ 12.908∗∗∗
(2.289) (2.288) (2.146) (2.161)
Population Above 65 334.072∗∗ 288.670∗ 952.514∗∗∗ 929.586∗∗∗
(154.699) (151.368) (186.796) (190.918)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 885 885 1,341 1,341
Adjusted R2 0.677 0.674 0.782 0.781
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.5: Ethnic Fractionalization and Expenditure Categories (County Level)
Share of general expenditures for
Welfare Roads Education Hospitals
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.011 −0.024∗∗∗ −0.031 −0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.031) (0.037)
Income per Capita −0.00000∗∗∗ −0.00000 0.00000 −0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Log Population Size 0.002∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Education 0.035∗ 0.027∗ −0.442∗∗∗ 0.063
(0.018) (0.014) (0.063) (0.072)
Inequality 0.004 −0.034∗∗∗ −0.049 0.133∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.008) (0.043) (0.041)
Violence per Capita −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.005∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001)
Population Above 65 0.080∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ −0.836∗∗∗ 0.067
(0.020) (0.023) (0.096) (0.097)
Debt per Capita 0.00000 −0.00000 −0.00000 −0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,341 1,341 1,341 1,341
R2 0.750 0.592 0.441 0.236
Adjusted R2 0.739 0.575 0.417 0.203
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.6: Instrumented Ethnic Fractionalization (County Level)
Dependent variable:
Taxes per Capita Exp per Capita
(1) (2)
Ethnic Fractionalization (instrumented) 142.697∗∗ 591.160∗∗∗
(55.485) (136.126)
Income per Capita 0.065∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.008)






Violence per Capita 844.295∗∗∗ 1, 035.676∗∗∗
(160.114) (392.820)
Population Above 65 0.004∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.004)
Debt per Capita 13.606∗∗∗ 31.671∗∗∗
(1.784) (4.376)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 1,341 1,341
R2 0.789 0.629
Adjusted R2 0.780 0.613




Proof of Lemma 3.1
The utility function given by:
ui(Ei, c, g, E−i) = α{β(Ei)ρ + (1− β)cρ}
ν




The group maximizes ui(.) subject to the constraint:
Ei + φic = φi(1− t)w (3.20)
where t is the tax rate on wages, w.
Second stage results:
Setting up Lagrangian:
L(Ei, c, g, E−i, λi) = u(Ei, c, g, E−i)− λi(Ei + φic− φi(1− t)w)
= α{β(Ei)ρ + (1− β)cρ}
ν
ρ + γg − δ
∑
j 6=i






{β(Ei)ρ + (1− β)cρ}(
ν
ρ
−1)β(E∗i )(ρ−1)ρ− λi = 0 (3.22)
c : αν
ρ
{β(Ei)ρ + (1− β)cρ}(
ν
ρ
−1)(1− β)(c∗i )(ρ−1)ρ− λiφi = 0 (3.23)
λi : −E∗i − φic∗i + φi(1− t)w = 0 (3.24)













c∗i = E∗i (3.25)



















i (1− t)wc∗i (3.27)











 ≡ (1− t)κc(φi) (3.28)
Using (3.25) we get:














≡ (1− t)κE(φi) (3.30)
where κc(φi) and κE(φi) are the exogenous coefficients of c∗i and E∗i respectively that are










We normalize δ to 1. Utility maximization solution for the goverment with distribution
















































































tλmφm = 1− (Ωλmφm)
−1
1−ν (3.38)
where Ωλmφm is given by ratio of the weighted gains to increasing tax and the weighted
loss of increasing taxes for a given group distribution φm and social weights λm.
Proof of Corollary 3.1






1− ν > 0 ∀ν ∈ (0, 1) (3.39)
Comparative statics in E∗i and c∗i w.r.t φi



































































i }+ 2 ρ(1−ρ)φ
− ρ1−ρ−1





































 < 0 ∀ρ < 0
(3.43)
(Since 11− ρ ∈ (0, 1) for all ρ < 0)
Thus, κE(φi) is increasing and concave in φi for all ρ < 0 which means for a fixed t, total





















































· (3.46)(− ρ1−ρ − 1)φ
− ρ1−ρ−2
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(Since ρ < 1/2 when ρ < 0)
Thus, κc(φi) is increasing and concave in φi for any ρ < 0 which means that for a given
t equilibrium private consumption c∗i is also increasing and concave in φi for ρ < 0.
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Proof of Proposition 3.1





Now for government with λi = 1:




Li(φm) = να (βκE(φi)ρ + (1− β)κc(φi)ρ)
ν
ρ (3.51)
Using corollary 2, to show t∗maj(φm) < t∗u(φm) < t∗min(φm) we use Ωmaj(φm) < Ωu(φm) <
Ωmin(φm).
A sufficient condition for this is if for all i, k ∈ N with φi < φk,
Gi(φm) > Gk(φm) > 0 (3.52)







Since Gu(φm) is a convex combination of {Gi(φm)}i∈M and Lu(φm) is a convex combina-
tion of {Li(φm)}i∈M .
Proof of eq. (3.52)













κE(φj) + κE(φi) (3.56)
= κE(φk)− κE(φi) > 0 (3.57)
(Since κE(φi) is increasing in φi) (3.58)
Proof of eq. (3.53): We use






βg′(x)g(x)ρ−1 + (1− β)f ′(x)f(x)ρ−1
) ν−ρ
ρ > 0 (3.59)
(when g′(x), f ′(x), g(x), f(x) > 0) (3.60)
Lk(φm)− Li(φm) > 0 (3.61)
As κ′E(φi), κE(φi), κ′c(φ), κc(φ) > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 3.2
Majority government










< 0 and ∂Lλmφm
∂φ1
> 0.
Now if λ1 = 1 we have:



























































1− φ1 − φ′i
m− 2 ) + κE(φ1) (3.72)














Gmin(φ1, φ′i) = γw + (m− 2)κE(
1− φ1 − φ′i







(1− φ1 − φ′i)
m− 2 ) + κ
′
E(φ1) < 0 (3.75)
⇐⇒ κ′E(
1− φ1 − φ′i








Proof of Proposition 3.3
Majority Government
Clearly, Lmaj(φ1) is independent of m.
























Ωmin(φ1,m) = Gmin(φ1,m)/Lmin(φ1,m) (3.83)
=
(m− 2)κE(1−φ1m−1 ) + κE(φ1)








Clearly, Lmin(φ1,m) decreases with m as κE(.) and κc(.) decrease with m. Thus, if we
show Gmin(φ1,m) increases with m then we are done with the proof.
∆Gmin(φ1,m)



































m− 1 and ρ < 0) (3.87)
=⇒ > 0 (3.88)
Hence we have ∆Ωmin(φ1,m)∆m > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Follows from proof of Proposition 3.2.
Proof of Proposition 3.5





Gmaj(φ1, φ2,m) = γw + (m− 2)κE(
(1− φ1 − φ2)




(1− φ1 − φ2)
m− 2 ) + κ
′
E(φ2) < 0 (3.91)
(By concavity of κE and by definition φ2 >
(1− φ1 − φ2)
m− 2 )
(3.92)
When φ1 < 0.5 and φ1 + φ2 > 0.5 then group 2 is the median voter. This means that
λ2 = 1







Proof of Lemma 3.2
Extensive and intensive margin relationship with fractionalization:





= 1− φ21 −
(1− φ1)2
m− 1 (3.94)
Extensive margin: Clearly ∆FRAC∆m > 0.
Intensive margin: Differentiating FRAC w.r.t φ1 we get, ∂FRAC∂φ1 < 0 ∀ φ1 > 1/m.











φ2i (1− φi)} (3.96)



















(m− 1)2 } (3.99)
Extensive margin: For m > 2 we have ∆POL∆m < 0.
Intensive margin: Differentiating with respect to φ1 we get:
∂POL
∂φ1










+ (1− φ1)(2φ1 −
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Clearly, the quadratic roots φ1 when setting DPOL = 0 are a function of m. Since
DPOL is a concave function the maximal root φ̄1(m) is such that there exists ε > 0 such
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